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RULES WERE NOT MEANT TO BE BROKEN:  
ALLEVIATING THE TENSION BETWEEN 
PRIVACY AND DISCOVERY IN MEDICAL 
RECORD DISPUTES 
We have strict statutes and most biting laws 
(The needful bits and curbs to headstrong weeds), 
Which for these fourteen years we have let slip.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
William Shakespeare critiqued various approaches to law 
application within Measure for Measure.2  As Vincentio, the Duke of 
Vienna, prepared to appoint the position of deputy to the strict law 
enforcer Angelo, he bemoaned that the lax attitude towards enforcement 
had effectively defeated the laws’ existence.3  Thus, Vincentio believed 
that a strict enforcer, such as Angelo, would improve the corrupt city; 
however, extreme strictness eventually proved ineffective as well, 
causing Vincentio to strike a balance that upheld the law but preserved 
humanity.4   
The current application of law includes a similar tension despite the 
elaborate organization of society that involves laws, rules, and 
regulations, which various institutions enforce.5  The judicial system is a 
prominent source of law application, where opposing parties utilize the 
adversarial system to protect personal interests.6  Unlike Measure for 
Measure, where law enforcement involved quick judgments, each judicial 
proceeding in the adversarial system must follow rules of procedure.7  
Although these rules provide numerous and, at times, complex 
requirements, the intent of these rules is to provide just adjudication of 
                                                 
1 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE act 1, sc. 3, ll.19–21 (G. Blakemore 
Evans ed., 2d ed. Houghton Mifflin Co. 1997). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. at act 1, sc. 3, l.28. 
4 Id. at act 5, sc. 1. 
5 This Note focuses on the federal procedural rules that parties must follow in order to 
adjudicate claims in the federal courts.  See infra text accompanying note 9.  However, this 
Note also ties in federal regulations and statutes.  See supra notes 76–82 and accompanying 
text (describing the federal regulations and statutes pertaining to the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”)). 
6 See infra Parts II.C.1–2 (setting forth the controversies that this Note addresses in 
detail). 
7 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 
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every claim.8  Thus, just as Vincentio served the purpose of the law by 
ultimately issuing a proportionate rather than authoritarian punishment, 
the federal courts should carry out the procedural rules’ intent by 
striking an appropriate balance between competing interests. 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rules”), governing the 
pretrial actions of parties, include the Rules of discovery.9  Discovery 
becomes problematic due to the competing interests between applying 
the Rules of procedure and protecting the right to privacy that may be 
lost if parties must disclose documents during discovery.10  Recent 
discovery decisions may have the effect of making these Rules “become[] 
more mock’d than fear’d.”11  Specifically, when comparing discovery 
decisions in courts addressing HIV-patients’ medical records with courts 
addressing Congress’ Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 (“PBAB”), 
the latter grants greater deference to the challenging parties.12  Although 
disclosure of each type of medical record poses similar privacy 
infringement problems due to social stigmas associated with each class 
of patients, courts have applied the discovery Rules differently, causing 
confusion and inequitable Rule application.13 
Setting the background to the discovery process, Part II describes the 
Rules of discovery, the fundamental right to privacy, and the cases 
applying the discovery Rules that attempt to reconcile the tension 
between discovery and privacy.14  Next, Part III synthesizes the 
background information, criticizing the inaccurate interpretation of the 
discovery Rules and the inconsistency these decisions present in light of 
                                                 
8 FED. R. CIV. P. 1.  This Rule states:  “[These rules] shall be construed and administered 
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.”  Id. 
9 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26; FED. R. CIV. P. 45. 
10 See infra Part II.B.  The Constitution does not explicitly provide that privacy is a 
fundamental right.  Therefore, this Part sets forth the critical Supreme Court decisions 
regarding privacy as a fundamental right.  See Griswold v. Connecticut, 481 U.S. 479, 482 
(1965).  Supreme Court cases, described infra Part II.B, addressing privacy of personal 
records, provide insight into the tension between discovery and privacy. 
11 SHAKESPEARE, supra note 1, at act 2, sc. 1; see infra Part II.C.2 (setting forth recent 
Partial Birth Abortion Ban (“PBAB”) challenges). 
12 Compare infra Part II.C.1 with infra Part II.C.2. 
13 See generally infra Part III (analyzing the cases set forth infra Parts II.C.1–2 and 
criticizing inconsistent Rule application within these cases). 
14 Part II.A describes the procedural Rules of discovery to provide a basis for analyzing 
cases that apply these rules.  See infra Part II.A.  Next, Part II.B traces Supreme Court cases 
that have developed privacy as a fundamental right.  See infra Part II.B.  Part II.C applies 
Parts II.A and II.B by describing cases that address admission of medical records of HIV 
and partial-birth abortion patients.  See infra Part II.C.  A background to the federal PBAB, 
preceding the latter category of cases, provides the framework for these cases to clarify the 
nature of the claims and illustrate the timeliness of these decisions.  See infra Part II.C. 
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other decisions and recent legislation.15  Finally, Part IV expands and 
applies the analysis with a model approach to discovery disputes 
regarding medical records to provide a guide to the federal courts.16   
II.  DISCOVERY RULES, PRIVACY, AND THE ADMISSIBILITY OF MEDICAL 
RECORDS 
Even like an o’ergrown lion in a cave, 
That goes not out to prey.17 
As the plot unfolded in Measure for Measure, when Angelo applied 
severe punishments to common crimes, Vincentio realized that just law 
enforcement required a balance between strictness and mercy.18  The 
need for this balance appears in today’s adversarial system, and the 
Rules provide the means for the federal courts to execute the just 
adjudication of disputes.19  Specifically, the Rules of discovery play the 
indispensable role of providing efficient and productive means for 
adversaries to interact.20  In order to maintain productivity, courts must 
apply these Rules flexibly, granting parties access to all relevant material 
in order to fully develop all possible legal arguments.21  However, 
because parties may request sensitive information, such as medical 
records, courts must protect patients’ privacy interests.22   
To highlight the baseline Rules and intent of discovery, Part II.A 
begins by describing Rule 26 as the general background to the scope of 
discovery.23  Additionally, this Part sets forth Rule 45, which allows 
                                                 
15 See infra Part III. 
16 See infra Part IV. 
17 SHAKESPEARE, supra note 1, at act 1, sc. 3, ll.22–23.  These lines extend Vincentio’s view 
that laws become useless if not applied as intended.  Id. 
18 Id. at act 1, sc. 1, ll.43–45.  Essentially, in this passage, Vincentio tells Angelo, as he 
appoints his authority, to apply either the death sentence or grant the criminal mercy 
depending upon the situation.  Id.  Eventually, Angelo wishes to apply to a death sentence 
to a man who impregnated a woman.  Id. at act 2, sc.1.  Vincentio, realizing that Angelo 
was guilty of the same actions as Claudio, delegated punishments at the conclusion of the 
play.  Id. at act 5, sc. 1.  However, none of these punishments included the death sentence.  
Id. 
19 See FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
20 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26, 45. 
21 See infra note 36 and accompanying text (describing the Advisory Committee’s 
reasoning for allowing broad discovery). 
22 See infra Part II.B (describing the impact of privacy interests upon discovery requests). 
23 See infra Part II.A.  Although this Note addresses Washington and Florida’s rules of 
discovery, these rules are similar in intent and language to the federal Rule.  See FLA. R. 
CIV. P. 1.280; WASH. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 26.  The background of Rule 26 explains the 
evolution of the Rule, including the intent of the Advisory Committee involved.  See infra 
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parties to issue subpoenas for discovery and request orders to limit 
discovery.24  Because privacy concerns arise in the discovery of medical 
records, Part II.B traces the development of privacy as a fundamental 
right through Supreme Court decisions.25  Finally, Part II.C articulates 
the two categories of discovery disputes this Note addresses:  (1) HIV-
patients’ medical records and (2) partial-birth abortion patients’ medical 
records.26  
A. Rules 26 and 45:  Favoring Broad Disclosure 
Under the current discovery Rules, Rule 26 controls the discovery 
period prior to trial where parties initially seek information for claims 
and defenses.  Even though the general provisions of Rule 26 provide 
ample opportunity for discovery,27 this Rule has been tailored to provide 
courts with the authority to limit the scope of a discovery request.28  For 
                                                                                                             
notes 28, 30, 33–36 and accompanying text.  Also, it expounds the conditions where parties 
may oppose and successfully refuse to comply with discovery requests.  See infra text 
accompanying notes 39–48. 
24 See infra Part II.A.  Because courts may choose to admit this material by requiring 
redaction, this Part addresses the redaction process for medical records.  See 45 C.F.R. 
§ 164.514(b)(2)(i) (2004) (delineating items to eliminate from medical records to ensure that 
they are not individually identifiable). 
25 See infra Part II.B.  This Part focuses upon the U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis of the 
differing types of privacy that receive constitutional protection.  Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (establishing that the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth 
Amendments contain guarantees that create zones of privacy).  There are two types of 
privacy that the Supreme Court has established as protected:  privacy to make decisions 
and privacy of personal records, the latter of which is the focus of this Note.  See infra text 
accompanying notes 69–74.  A brief description of HIPAA addresses the current methods 
of disclosing medical records.  See infra text accompanying notes 75–82. 
26 Part II.C.1; see Inmates of N.Y. with HIV v. Cuomo, No. 90-CV-252, 1991 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 1488 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 1991); Doe v. Meachum, 126 F.R.D. 444 (D. Conn. 1989); Doe 
v. Puget Sound Blood Center, 819 P.2d 370 (Wash. 1991); S. Fla. Blood Serv., Inc. v. 
Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); see also Nw. Mem’l Hosp. v. Aschcroft, 
362 F.3d 923 (7th Cir. 2004); Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Ashcroft, No. 03 Civ. 8695 (RCC), 2004 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4530 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2004); Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Ashcroft, No. 04-
70658, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4491 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 12, 2004); Planned Parenthood Fed’n of 
Am., Inc. v. Ashcroft, No. C 03-4872 PJH, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3383 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 
2004).  A brief explanation of the PBAB precedes these cases to highlight the controversy 
surrounding these challenges.  See generally 18 U.S.C.A. § 1531 (West Supp. 2005). 
27 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).  Within this subsection, the Rule states that “parties may 
obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or 
defense of any party.”  Id.  The Rule describes the various materials that parties may obtain, 
which include documents.  Id.  Additionally, the Rule states that if a party shows good 
cause, he may discover material that is relevant only to the subject matter, and the material 
does not need to be admissible at trial.  Id. 
28 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) advisory committee’s note (1983).  “The rule contemplates greater 
judicial involvement in the discovery process and thus acknowledges the reality that it 
cannot always operate on a self-regulating basis.”  Id. 
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example, in the interest of time and expense, Rule 26 authorizes courts to 
limit the extent of discovery.29  Within this limitation, courts have the 
ability to consider substantive issues, such as policy or personal interests, 
but the Rules’ intent requires that courts utilize these standards in an 
“even-handed manner.”30  It is imperative that lower courts apply these 
limitations carefully because appellate courts rarely address discovery 
decisions.31   
The threshold inquiry in discovery disputes is whether the 
information is relevant to the litigation.32  Relevance is an essential 
element within Rules 26 and 45, but it may be unclear whether a 
discovery request is outside the scope of these Rules.33  The inquiry 
becomes ambiguous when the information sought is relevant to the 
                                                 
29 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2).  This Rule sets forth three circumstances that permit the court 
to limit discovery: 
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods otherwise 
permitted under these rules and by any local rule shall be limited by 
the court if it determines that:  (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably 
cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that 
is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party 
seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the 
action to obtain the information sought; or (iii) the burden or expense 
of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, taking into 
account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ 
resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the 
importance of the proposed discovery in resolving  the issues. 
Id. 
30 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) advisory committee’s note (1983): 
Thus the rules recognize that many cases in public policy spheres, such 
as employment practices, free speech, and other matters, may have 
importance far beyond the monetary amount involved.  The court 
must apply the standards in an even-handed manner that will prevent 
the use of discovery to wage a war of attrition or as a device to coerce a 
party, whether financially weak or affluent. 
Id. 
31 Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979) (holding that the Supreme Court would not 
review the district court’s rulings on relevancy because the review was not within the 
boundaries of questions certified for review, but emphasizing that district courts cannot 
neglect their power to make discovery decisions); ACF Indus. v. EEOC, 439 U.S. 1081, 
1087–88 (1979) (holding that the district courts are in the best position to control and curb 
the abuse of discovery, but that flagrant abuses of discovery may be addressed by courts of 
appeal). 
32 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
33 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) advisory committee’s note (2000).  The Advisory Committee 
recognized that there is not a clear line between material that is relevant to the claims and 
defenses and material that is relevant only to the subject matter of the controversy.  Id.  
Thus, the committee decided that the term “relevant” may include information relevant to 
the subject matter of the action if the court finds a showing of good cause supporting the 
discovery of the information.  Id. 
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subject matter of the controversy but not directly related to the specific 
claims.34  However, as long as the party requesting discovery can show 
good cause, defined as a legally sufficient reason, the court has the 
authority to order discovery of any material relevant to the subject 
matter of the litigation.35  Rule 26 permits this flexible good cause 
standard because issues of relevancy inherently lack precision.36  
Ultimately, if the requesting party can show that the material is 
“reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence,” 
then it satisfies the relevancy requirement of Rule 26.37  Even so, the 
Supreme Court has encouraged the federal district courts to apply 
limitations where necessary “to protect a party or person from 
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense,” 
reaffirming Rule 26(c)’s intent to involve courts in discovery disputes.38  
Due to parties’ unwillingness to volunteer potentially harmful 
information, they might not respond to a request for documents.  
Therefore, when the parties cannot successfully gain discovery materials 
through production requests, they may utilize Rule 45 and issue a 
subpoena.39  According to Rule 45, when the requesting party serves the 
                                                 
34 Id.  For instance, the requesting party in a dispute regarding whether a particular 
product was defective may subpoena information regarding other products the company 
manufactures.  Although it may not be relevant to the claim at hand, information regarding 
other products may provide information relevant to the subject matter of the company’s 
manufacturing. 
35 Id.; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 213 (7th ed. 1999) (defining good cause as a 
legally sufficient reason). 
36 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (2000).  The Advisory Committee 
emphasized that the court may become involved to determine whether certain discovery is 
relevant.  Id.  The courts should use the good cause standard in discovery determinations, 
and the committee emphasized that this standard is meant to be flexible.  Id.  The 
committee provided the example that “information that could be used to impeach a 
witness, although not otherwise relevant to the claims or defenses, might be properly 
discoverable.”  Id.  Although critics of this approach proposed that the committee delete the 
“subject matter” language to narrow the scope of discovery, the committee rejected this 
approach, delegating the courts with authority to address overbroad discovery.  Id. 
37 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978) 
(“Nor is discovery limited to the merits of a case, for a variety of fact-oriented issues may 
arise during litigation that are not related to the merits.”). 
38 Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979) (encouraging district courts to use their 
authority to issue protective orders when appropriate); see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). 
39 FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3)(A).  Essentially, if the subpoena does not follow certain 
procedural requirements, demands a party or non-party to travel a long distance, or 
presents an undue burden, then the court must quash or modify the subpoena: 
On timely motion, the court by which a subpoena was issued shall 
quash or modify the subpoena if it 
(i) fails to allow a reasonable time for compliance; 
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opposing party with a proper subpoena, the serving party should avoid 
placing an undue burden upon the person subject to that subpoena.40  
Hence, parties that issue subpoenas under Rule 45 must show an initial 
consideration for the personal interests of the opposing party.41   
Despite the issuance of a subpoena, the receiving party still may be 
unwilling to disclose the information requested.  Thus, Rule 45 permits 
the receiving party to move the court to quash or modify the subpoena, 
providing a safeguard for parties’ privacy rights.42  Courts must quash or 
modify a subpoena if the party issuing the subpoena requests privileged 
or protected information.43  When a party moves to quash or modify a 
subpoena on this ground, the moving party must support the objection 
by describing how the information is protected.44   
Additionally, courts must quash or modify the subpoena when it 
“subjects a person to undue burden.”45  In this situation, the objecting 
                                                                                                             
(ii) requires a person who is not a party or an officer of a party to travel 
to a place more than 100 miles from the place where the person resides, 
is employed or regularly transacts business in person, except that, 
subject to the provisions of clause (c)(3)(B)(iii) of this rule, such a 
person may in order to attend trial be commanded to travel from any 
such place within the state in which the trial is held, or 
(iii) requires a disclosure of privileged or other protected matter and 
no exception or waiver applies, or 
(iv) subjects a person to undue burden. 
Id. 
40 FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(1).  If the requesting party does not achieve this standard, the 
party or attorney in breach will be subject to sanctions.  Id. 
41 See id.  For example, the requesting party should not subpoena information that is 
clearly of a sensitive or embarrassing nature without offering some sort of privacy 
protection for the producing party. 
42 FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3)(A). 
43 Id. at 45(c)(3)(A)(iii); see also Streett v. United States, No. 96-m-6-H, 1996 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 19898, at *13 (W.D. Va. Dec. 18, 1996) (remanding for a determination of whether the 
IRS information sought was privileged). 
44 FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(2).  This subsection of Rule 45 sets the requirements that a party 
must meet in order to claim the material sought is privileged or subject to protection: 
When information subject to a subpoena is withheld on a claim that it 
is privileged or subject to protection as trial preparation materials, the 
claim shall be made expressly and shall be supported by a description 
of the nature of the documents, communications, or things not 
produced that is sufficient to enable the demanding party to contest 
the claim. 
Id. 
45 Id. at 45(c)(3)(A)(iv); see also Anderson v. Shell Oil Co., No. 93-2235, 1996 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 7497 (E.D. La. May 23, 1996) (upholding a protective order issued to grant plaintiffs 
greater time than the opposing party offered in a subpoena for a deposition). 
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party must show that an undue burden exists,46 and courts must balance 
the following factors:  “the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, 
the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the 
litigation, and importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the 
issues.”47  Rule 45 encourages courts to modify the subpoena through 
redaction or a protective order.48  Given that Rules 26 and 45 permit 
balancing “issues at stake in litigation,” courts may consider the rights of 
the parties involved.49  Specifically, in objections to requests for medical 
                                                 
46 Alexander v. FBI, No. 96-2123, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11928, at *15–16 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 
1998) (enforcing a Rule 45 subpoena for a deposition because the non-party to be deposed 
did not carry its burden for showing good cause for a protective order and steps had been 
taken to avoid placing an undue burden on the non-party); Sentry Ins. v. Shivers, 164 
F.R.D. 255, 257 (D.C. Kan. 1996) (rejecting the claim that a second deposition was unduly 
burdensome because the party claimed only financial stress, which was a typical result of 
litigation). 
47 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) (stating that the extent of the discovery methods may be 
limited upon a finding of undue burden); see Linder v. Calero-Portocarrero, 183 F.R.D. 314, 
324 (D.D.C. 1998). 
48 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) sets forth the available protective orders: 
(1) that the disclosure or discovery not be had; 
(2) that the disclosure or discovery may be had only on specified terms 
and conditions, including a designation of the time or place; 
(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other 
than that selected by the party seeking discovery; 
(4) that certain matters may not be inquired into, or that the scope of 
the disclosure or discovery be limited to certain matters; 
(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons 
designated by the court; 
(6) that a deposition, after being sealed, be opened only by order of the 
court; 
(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or 
commercial information not be revealed or be revealed only in a 
designated way; and 
(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or 
information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by 
the court. 
Id.; see also Linder, 183 F.R.D. at 321 (expressing that modifying subpoenas is preferred to 
outright quashing).  Another means to modify a discovery request is redaction, which is 
the editing of a document to “remove confidential references or offensive material.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1281 (7th ed. 1999).  The encouragement of modification is 
significant because if subpoenas for medical records may be modified by eliminating 
individually identifiable information from all medical records, then discovery becomes 
feasible.  See infra text accompanying notes 78–82 (describing that HIPAA protects only 
individually identifiable material).  For further analysis of the value of protective orders to 
foster access to the courts, see Richard J. Vangelisti, Proposed Amendment to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 26(c) Concerning Protective Orders:  A Critical Analysis of What it Means and 
How it Operates, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 163, 174–75 (1996). 
49 See infra Parts II.C.1–2 (describing the cases where parties opposing the discovery of 
their medical records assert their privacy interests in such records). 
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records, courts consider the parties’ interest in maintaining privacy.50  
Thus, the fundamental right to privacy validates courts’ deference to 
privacy concerns in discovery disputes.51   
B. The Fundamental Right to Privacy:  Not Absolute in Terms of Personal 
Records 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that privacy is a 
fundamental right, triggering a conflict between discovery and 
protecting patients’ privacy.52  The Constitution implicitly protects two 
distinguishable types of privacy:  (1) the right to privacy of personal 
decisions, and (2) the right to privacy of personal information.53  
Although the Supreme Court has deemed both types of privacy to be 
fundamental rights, it has determined that the right to privacy of 
personal information is not absolute.54 
The landmark Supreme Court case acknowledging that privacy to 
make personal decisions is a fundamental right is Griswold v. 
Connecticut.55  In Griswold, the appellants were a licensed physician and a 
professor serving as a medical director for a Planned Parenthood League 
center.56  After the trial court found the appellants in violation of two 
contraceptive statutes, several physicians challenged the statutes as a 
violation of the couple’s Fourteenth Amendment rights.57   
                                                 
50 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(iii); see also infra Parts II.C.1–2 (describing how courts examine 
the privacy interest involved in disclosure of medical records). 
51 See infra Part II.B. 
52 See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 
(1977); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
53 See infra notes 55–74 and accompanying text (describing the development of the right 
to privacy in personal decisions and the right to privacy of personal records). 
54 See generally Whalen, 429 U.S. 589. 
55 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
56 Id. at 480.  At this center, the appellants provided medical information and advice 
regarding contraceptives to married persons.  Id. 
57 Id.  The two Connecticut statutes at issue addressed giving out and using information 
pertaining to avoiding conception:  “Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or 
instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined not less than fifty 
dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined and 
imprisoned.”  Id. (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-32 (1958)).  “Any person who assists, abets, 
counsels, causes, hires or commands another to commit any offense may be prosecuted and 
punished as if he were the principal offender.”  Id.  (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-196 
(1958)).  Additionally, the Fourteenth Amendment provides:  “No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
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The Court conceded that the husband and wife had the right to make 
decisions regarding children free of government involvement.58  
Unfortunately, the Constitution did not offer explicit language regarding 
contraceptive rights, but it related the right to privacy to other 
fundamental rights.59  To resolve this dispute, the Court explained 
situations where First Amendment rights have been attached to claims 
with attenuated connections to speech.60  These connections allowed the 
Court to reach the important conclusion that the Bill of Rights provided 
“zones of privacy,”61 which arose from the implicit assurances of the 
First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments.62  Therefore, a 
governmental purpose to control activities could not invade areas of 
protected freedoms.63  The Supreme Court thus concluded that the 
                                                 
58 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482.  The Court recognized that: 
The association of people is not mentioned in the Constitution nor in 
the Bill of Rights.  The right to educate a child in a school of the 
parents’ choice—whether public or private or parochial—is also not 
mentioned.  Nor is the right to study any particular subject or any 
foreign language.  Yet the First Amendment has been construed to 
include certain of those rights. 
Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 482–83.  The Court introduced previous Supreme Court decisions that set the 
precedent that freedom of speech and freedom of the press involve the right to distribute, 
receive, and read, as well as the freedom of inquiry and thought.  Id.  Additionally, the 
Court upheld the precedent that the Constitution protects the freedom of association.  Id. at 
483. 
61 Id. at 484. 
62 Id.  The Supreme Court reasoned: 
Various guarantees create zones of privacy.  The right of association 
contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have 
seen.  The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering 
of soldiers “in any house” in time of peace without the consent of the 
owner is another facet of that privacy.  The Fourth Amendment 
explicitly affirms “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.”  The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause 
enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may 
not force him to surrender to his detriment.  The Ninth Amendment 
provides:  “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall 
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” 
Id. 
63 Id. at 485.  The Court found that the statutes at issue regulated the use of 
contraceptives, causing an adverse impact upon the relationship between the husband and 
wife.  Id. at 485–86. 
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sacred relationship between husbands and wives was too private for the 
government to justifiably invade.64 
The Supreme Court’s recognition of the right to protect decisions 
within a spousal relationship has offered litigants the opportunity to 
argue that the “zones of privacy” reach beyond the narrow decision in 
Griswold.65  In 2003, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the preservation of 
the fundamental right of privacy to make personal decisions in Lawrence 
v. Texas.66  In Lawrence, the Court held that a Texas statute criminalizing 
                                                 
64 Id. at 486.  Following this opinion, Justice Goldberg concurred, and Justice Brennan 
and the Chief Justice joined him.  Id. (Goldberg, J., concurring).  Justice Goldberg asserted 
that personal rights that are fundamental are not restricted to the language of the Bill of 
Rights.  Id.  This concurrence placed special emphasis on the Ninth Amendment’s inclusion 
of other rights not specifically named in the Constitution.  Id. at 487–88.  Justice Harlan also 
wrote a concurring opinion, asserting that the Connecticut statutes were unconstitutional 
Due Process Clause violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, avoiding the incorporation 
approach of the majority and Justice Goldberg.  Id. at 499–500 (Harlan, J., concurring).  
Justice White also utilized the Due Process Clause to declare the statutes unconstitutional 
in his concurrence.  Id. at 502–03 (White, J., concurring). 
 Justices Black and Stewart dissented from this decision, arguing that a more flexible 
interpretation of the constitutional Amendments effectively dilutes their meaning.  Id. at 
509–10 (Black, Stewart, JJ., dissenting).  Justice Stewart wrote a second dissenting opinion, 
criticizing the majority for not specifying which amendments guaranteed the right to 
marital privacy.  Id. at 528–29 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 Many subsequent cases have discussed and expanded the holding in Griswold. 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (explaining that Griswold recognized a 
right to be free from governmental intrusion regarding the personal decision to bear 
children); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (explaining that Griswold 
did not establish a framework clarifying how to handle cases that address those 
fundamental rights); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (holding a New 
York statute prohibiting the sale of contraceptives to minors unconstitutional); Moore v. 
City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1976) (reasserting the constitutional protection of the 
sanctity of family by reversing a conviction for violating an ordinance allowing only 
immediate families to reside together); see also notes 65–68 and accompanying text 
(describing further the expansion of Griswold). 
65 See generally Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (asserting that the right to 
privacy did not extend to a right to assisted suicide due to the history, legal traditions, and 
practice supporting criminalizing assisted suicide); Carey, 431 U.S. 678 (holding a statute 
unconstitutional that prohibited selling contraceptives to minors); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 
U.S. 160 (1976) (rejecting the argument that the right of parents to control the upbringing of 
their children should preclude the government from regulating the schools to avoid racial 
discrimination); United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973) (holding that the Constitution 
does not safeguard sending obscene materials into the stream of commerce); Paris Adult 
Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (rejecting the claim that the right to privacy included a 
right to watch obscene movies in places of public accommodation); United States v. Van 
Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970) (asserting a privacy interest in first-class mail); DeGregory v. 
Att’y Gen. of N.H., 383 U.S. 825 (1966) (holding that the Constitution protected the privacy 
interest within political and associational information). 
66 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  Justice O’Connor concurred with Justice Kennedy’s opinion that 
the statute violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, citing the Equal 
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sodomy violated the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.67  The 
Court reasoned that the fundamental right of privacy extended to an 
adult’s right to make decisions regarding his private behavior.68  
Beyond the right to make decisions, another “zone” for protection 
under the fundamental right to privacy is personal records.69  As this is a 
fundamental right, a party seeking discovery of personal records must 
show a compelling governmental interest that supports disclosure of the 
records.70  Although a compelling interest is a difficult burden to meet, 
the Supreme Court determined that disclosure of personal records was 
insufficient to preclude discovery in Whalen v. Roe.71  The Court, 
considering the constitutionality of a drug reporting statute, held that 
unintended disclosures resulting from judicial use of records was an 
insufficient reason to invalidate the statute.72  The Court ultimately 
upheld the reporting statute because the arguments that the statute 
precluded public access to drugs and impeded the right to practice 
medicine were unpersuasive.73  Thus, the argument that unintended 
public disclosures of medical information invalidated the statute did not 
                                                                                                             
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as the reason why the statute banning 
sodomy was unconstitutional.  Id. at 579.  Justices Scalia, Thomas, and the Chief Justice 
dissented, and Justice Scalia criticized the Court for overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 
186 (1986), which flatly refused to create a fundamental right to practice sodomy.  Id. at 586 
(Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice Thomas wrote separately to assert that the right to privacy 
was not explicit in the Constitution so the Supreme Court should not apply it.  Id. at 605 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). 
67 Id. at 578 (majority opinion). 
68 Id. (“[T]he case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each 
other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle.  The petitioners are 
entitled to respect for their private lives.”). 
69 See Hahnemann Univ. Hosp. v. Edgar, 74 F.3d 456 (3d Cir. 1996) (asserting that the 
Constitution protected the confidentiality of psychologists’ records due to the patients’ 
privacy interests); Indus. Found. of the S. v. Tex. Indus. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 
1996) (remanding the case to determine whether information was confidential under the 
common law right to privacy). 
70 Brilliantes v. Sup. Ct., 51 Cal. App. 4th 323, 339 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (finding that the 
state had a compelling interest to examine medical records that were a part of a fraud 
investigation). 
71 429 U.S. 589, 602 (1977).  In Whalen, the Court reasoned that the disclosure of sensitive 
medical information to qualified individuals was a necessary aspect of medicine.  Id.  
Moreover, states that require disclosures were practicing their responsibility to the health 
of the community.  Id. at 602 n.29.  Thus, the disclosure would not be an automatic 
impermissible invasion to privacy.  Id. at 602. 
72 Id. at 601–02. 
73 Id. at 602–04. 
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persuade the Supreme Court, showing that the public interest may at 
times require disclosure.74 
In addition to the Court’s attitude towards disclosing medical 
records, current legislation provides the manner in which Congress 
intends courts to treat discovery requests for medical records.75  Many 
states have statutes regarding health care information, but a recently 
promulgated federal statute, the Heath Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”),76 applies unless the state law 
preempts.77  Stated generally, HIPAA protects individually identifiable 
health information within medical records from disclosure without 
patient consent,78 but HIPAA places no restrictions on information that 
has been purged of identifiable information.79  Congress enacted HIPAA 
                                                 
74 Id. at 602 (describing that the Court and the states recognized that disclosure of 
records may actually serve public policy).  For further discussion of the right to privacy of 
records, specifically medical records, see Note, The Evolution of the Right to Privacy After Roe 
v. Wade, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 368, 399–400 (1987) (“[C]ourts have allowed the nonconsensual 
disclosure of medical records on the grounds that privacy must yield to the needs of society 
as reflected in the criminal justice system.”).  See generally Melissa E. Rosenthal, Liberal 
Discovery of Non-Party Records:  In Defense of the Defense, 7 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 59 (2000) 
(discussing New York decisions pertaining to the discovery of non-parties that comment on 
the extensive intent of discovery). 
75 See infra text accompanying notes 76–82. 
76 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320d-6(b) (West Supp. 2005); Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-191, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat. 1936) 1865; see also 
infra notes 79, 81 and accompanying text (describing federal regulations promulgated to 
carry out HIPAA that are relevant to this Note). 
77 45 C.F.R. § 160.203 (2004).  Generally, the Secretary may determine that federal law 
does not preempt state law in order to prevent fraud, to assure that the state may regulate 
insurance and health plans, to comply with state reporting for health care purposes, or to 
serve a compelling need “related to public health, safety, or welfare, and . . . if the Secretary 
determines that the intrusion into privacy is warranted when balanced against the need to 
be served.”  Id.  For purposes of this Note, the state statutes that HIPAA may preempt 
address whether patients must consent to disclosure of their medical records.  See 735 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5/8-802 (2004) (prohibiting health care personnel from disclosing any 
information obtained in working with any a patient without express consent, but providing 
several exceptions, such as trials for homicide or actions against the healthcare provider); 
N.Y.C.P.L.R. 4504(a) (2005) (requiring patient consent before disclosure). 
 For further information regarding HIPAA’s preemption of state health care statutes, 
see Jennifer Gunthrie, Time is Running Out—The Burdens and Challenges of HIPAA 
Compliance:  A Look at Preemption Analysis, the “Minimum Necessary” Standard, and the Notice 
of Privacy Practices, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 143, 149–52 (2003), and Adam Butera, Note, 
HIPAA Preemption Implications for Covered Entities Under State Law, 8 CONN. INS. L.J. 363, 
378–81 (2001–2002). 
78 United States Department of Health and Human Services, Summary of the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule, 4, available at https://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacysummary.pdf (last revised 
Oct. 5, 2003). 
79 See id.  Within this explanation of HIPAA, there is an explanation of the treatment of 
de-identified health information, or information that does not identify or excludes 
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to protect individual medical information, and it provides a workable 
definition of individually identifiable material to determine what 
information HIPAA protects.80  In accordance with Congress’ intent, 
HIPAA has set regulations for redaction, which protect patients’ 
identities while permitting disclosure of the medical records.81  
                                                                                                             
information that could cause identification of an individual.  Id.  HIPAA does not restrict 
the use or disclosure of such information based on the provisions of the following federal 
regulation: 
(1) Uses and disclosures to create de-identified information. A 
covered entity may use protected health information to create 
information that is not individually identifiable health information or 
disclose protected health information only to a business associate for 
such purpose, whether or not the de-identified information is to be 
used by the covered entity. 
(2) Uses and disclosures of de-identified information.  Health 
information that meets the standard and implementation specifications 
for de-identification under § 164.514(a) and (b) is considered not to be 
individually identifiable health information, ie., de-identified.  The 
requirements of this subpart do not apply to information that has been 
de-identified in accordance with the applicable requirements of 
§ 164.514, provided that: 
 (i)  Disclosure of a code or other means of record identification 
designed to enable coded or otherwise de-identified information to be 
re-identified constitutes a disclosure of protected health information; 
and 
 (ii)  If de-identified information is re-identified, a covered entity 
may use or disclose such re-identified information only as permitted or 
required by this subpart. 
45 C.F.R. § 164.502(d) (2004). 
80 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320d-6(b).  This statute states: 
(B)  [Information that] relates to the past, present, or future physical or 
mental health or condition of an individual, the provision of health 
care to an individual, or the past, present, or future payment for the 
provision of health care to an individual, and— 
 (i)  identifies the individual; or 
 (ii) with respect to which there is a reasonable basis to believe that 
the information can be used to identify the individual. 
Id.  This definition is helpful in analyzing whether the disclosure of medical records 
violates the fundamental right to privacy.  See infra Part III. 
81 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i), which lists the information that must be excluded from 
medical records to ensure that the records are not individually identifiable: 
(A) Names; 
(B) All geographic subdivisions smaller than a State, including street 
address, city, county, precinct, zip code, and their equivalent 
geocodes, except for the initial three digits of a zip code if, 
according to the current publicly available data from the Bureau 
of the Census: 
(1)  The geographic unit formed by combining all zip codes with 
the same three initial digits contains more than 20,000 people; and 
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According to HIPAA’s regulations, redaction sufficiently serves the 
purpose of protecting patients’ privacy.82   
C. Two Categories of Cases Addressing Admissibility of Medical Records 
The non-absolute protection of medical records,83 reflected in the 
Supreme Court’s decisions as well as Congress’ HIPAA, has emerged in 
cases addressing disclosure of Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus 
(“HIV”) patients’ medical records and challenges to the constitutionality 
of the PBAB.84  Although the use of medical records in judicial disputes 
is quite common, certain types of medical information may contain 
sensitive information capable of harm if brought into the public 
                                                                                                             
(2)  The initial three digits of a zip code for all such geographic 
units containing 20,000 or fewer people is changed to 000. 
(C) All elements of dates (except year) for dates directly related to an 
individual, including birth date, admission date, discharge date, 
date of death; and all ages over 89 and all elements of dates 
(including year) indicative of such age, except that such ages and 
elements may be aggregated into a single category of age 90 or 
older; 
(D) Telephone numbers; 
(E) Fax numbers; 
(F) Electronic mail addresses; 
(G) Social security numbers; 
(H) Medical record numbers; 
(I) Health plan beneficiary numbers; 
(J) Account numbers; 
(K) Certificate/license numbers; 
(L) Vehicle identifiers and serial numbers, including license plate 
numbers; 
(M) Device identifiers and serial numbers; 
(N) Web Universal Resource Locators (URLs); 
(O) Internet Protocol (IP) address numbers; 
(P) Biometric identifiers, including finger and voice prints; 
(Q) Full face photographic images and any comparable images; and 
(R)   Any other unique identifying number characteristic, or code, 
except as permitted by paragraph (c) of this section. 
Id. 
82 See id.  For further discussion the application of HIPAA, see Elliot B. Oppenheim, 
HIPAA 2004—A Review of Significant Litigated Cases, 1-5 MEALEY’S PRIVACY REP. 25 (2004), 
which describes that only three cases have deeply addressed “the statute’s length and 
breadth and intent,” one of which was Northwestern Memorial Hospital v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 
923 (7th Cir. 2004).  See infra Part II.C.2. 
83 See EMANUEL HAYT, LL.B., LEGAL ASPECTS OF MEDICAL RECORDS 195 (Physician’s 
Record Co. 3d ed., 1973).  Hayt notes that when patients enter a hospital and receive 
treatment, the patients’ expectation of privacy must change.  Id.  The hospital may disclose 
information in response to public interest because of the nature of the treatment or the 
position of the patients within society.  Id. 
84 See infra Parts II.C.1–2. 
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spectrum.85  Specifically, disclosing the records of HIV-patients has 
proven to be socially detrimental because of the negative stigmas and 
fears attached to this virus.86  Additionally, disclosing medical records of 
partial-birth abortion patients is harmful to those patients due to current 
attitudes towards this controversial procedure and the “lifelong stigma 
of unwed mothers.”87   
                                                 
85 See infra notes 86–87 and accompanying text. 
86 See infra note 93; see also SHARON RENNERT, AIDS/HIV AND CONFIDENTIALITY:  MODEL 
POLICY AND PROCEDURES 18, 90–92 (A.B.A. 1991) (describing the ways in which disclosure 
of infection has negative social ramifications).  Rennert offers background information 
pertaining to the HIV virus and AIDS.  Id. at 91–92.  Generally, this attitude stems from fear 
of contracting the disease and the belief that the disease is associated with socially 
unacceptable behavior and immorality.  HIV & AIDS:  Stigma & Discrimination, 
http://www.avert.org/aidsstigma.htm (last revised Nov. 30, 2004) (describing that 
discrimination and increased social rejection of homosexuals, injecting drug users, and sex 
workers have resulted from this disease).  A few specific effects of this negative stigma are 
harassment; murder in several countries; and financial, social, and medical disadvantages 
for women.  Id.  The social stigma for women is that they are the sole source of sexually 
transmitted diseases.  Id.  Also, discrimination in the workplace occurs through pre-
employment screening in some countries.  Id.; see also United States HIV & AIDS Statistics 
Summary, http://www.avert.org/statsum.htm (last revised Dec. 23, 2004) (showing the 
widespread legislative response to the negative stigmas).  This statistical summary states: 
Since 1999, the following 33 areas have had laws or regulations 
requiring confidential name-based HIV infection reporting:  Alabama, 
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, 
Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming, and the US 
Virgin Islands.  Since July 1997, Florida has had confidential name-
based HIV infection reporting only for new diagnoses. 
Id.  For a general analysis of the discovery of HIV-patient records that supports limited 
disclosure, see Amy L. Fisher, Note, AIDS:  The Life and Death Conflict Between Confidentiality 
of Blood Donors and the Recovery of Blood Recipients, 42 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 283 
(1992). 
87 J.C. Willke, A Health Exception, LIFE ISSUES CONNECTOR, Oct. 2004, at 1; see HOWARD 
BALL, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE INTIMATE LIVES OF AMERICANS:  BIRTH, SEX, 
CHILDREARING, AND DEATH 114–15 (N.Y. Univ. Press 2002) (describing the procedure, 
whose graphic nature contributes to this attitude).  Ball describes that the development of 
the PBAB was a result of the National Right to Life Committee’s campaign that focused on 
the arguably inhumane nature of the procedure: 
It is a three-day procedure generally performed between the twentieth 
and twenty-fourth weeks of pregnancy, the mid term of the pregnancy.  
On the third day, the physician removes the fetus from the woman’s 
uterus.  “However, the head, which is too big to pass through the 
dilated cervix, remains in the internal cervical opening.  At this point, 
the physician takes a pair of blunt curved scissors and forces scissors 
into the base of the skull.”  This enables the doctor to remove the skull 
contents with a suction device.  “The head will then compress, 
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Both sets of patients face the possibility of strong social criticism if 
their identities and medical information become public.  Thus, courts 
treat the parties’ privacy loss due to disclosure of their medical records 
as an undue burden.88  Hence, a logical assumption is that courts apply 
the privacy concern in a similar fashion in both types of cases.  However, 
deference to privacy arguments within these two categories differs.89  
Examining cases where parties seek medical records of HIV-patients and 
partial-birth abortion patients exemplifies the difficult application of the 
discovery Rules.90  Because both categories address the “undue burden” 
objection to discovery, the courts in each case considered the “issues at 
stake” in the litigation by balancing the importance of privacy, 
government interest, and social policies.91  However, the reasoning 
applied regarding privacy infringement within the two classes of cases 
differs.92    
1. HIV-Patient Controversies 
Within the first class of cases, the medical records sought included 
records pertaining to HIV.93  In Doe v. Puget Sound,94 a discovery order 
required a blood center to provide the name of a person who donated 
                                                                                                             
enabling the physician to remove the fetus completely from the 
woman.” 
Id.; see also Shannen W. Coffin, The Abortion Distortion:  What the ‘Pro-Choice’ People Have 
Done to Law, Medicine, and Language, NAT’L REV., July 12, 2004 (“[T]he abhorrent partial-
birth method, in which a doctor delivers a living child until its legs and torso are hanging 
outside the mother and then pierces the child’s skull with a sharp instrument and vacuums 
out its brains.”). 
88 See infra Parts II.C.1–2. 
89 Compare infra Part II.C.1 with infra Part II.C.2. 
90 See infra Parts II.C.1–2. 
91 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2). 
92 Compare infra Part II.C.1 with infra Part II.C.2. 
93 See Inmates of N.Y. with HIV v. Cuomo, No. 90-CV-252, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1488 
(N.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 1991); Doe v. Meachum, 126 F.R.D. 444 (D. Conn. 1989); Doe v. Puget 
Sound Blood Center, 819 P.2d 370 (Wash. 1991); S. Fla. Blood Serv. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 
2d 798 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).  In Rasmussen, the court described the sensitivity 
associated with AIDS patients as a result of the high mortality rate.  467 So. 2d at 800.  
Researchers found that certain groups of people, such as bisexual or homosexual people 
with multiple sex partners, drug users, hemophiliacs, heterosexual partners of AIDS 
victims, and blood transfusion recipients each have a higher risk of infection with the virus.  
Id.  The gravity of this disease has caused reactions of fear within society.  Id.  Therefore, 
the individuals with AIDS must deal with “social censure, embarrassment and 
discrimination in nearly every phase of their lives, including jobs, education and housing.”  
Id. at 800.  Thus, a reasonable inference regarding AIDS or HIV-infected individuals is that 
the disclosure of this information would have a significant and detrimental effect on their 
lives.  See id. 
94 819 P.2d 370 (Wash. 1991). 
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blood to the center.95  The plaintiff received blood during an emergency 
surgery that was contaminated with the Aquired Immuno-Deficiency 
Sydrome (“AIDS”) virus, and he consequently died.96  As a result, the 
plaintiff’s estate claimed that the blood center was liable for failing to 
design an effective screening process and requested the identity of the 
AIDS-infected donor in order to evaluate the blood center and possibly 
pursue a negligence claim against the donor.97  On appeal, the blood 
center argued that the donor’s identity was privileged, that 
nondisclosure was justified, and that the court must recognize and 
protect the donor’s privacy; the Supreme Court of Washington 
disagreed.98 
Balancing the interests involved, the Washington Supreme Court 
first recognized the plaintiff’s interest, given the constitutional guarantee 
of access to the courts and the importance of the plaintiff’s need for 
discovery to develop the claims against the blood center and a possible 
claim against the donor.99  Next, the court concluded that the donor’s 
privacy right held little weight given that the donor had died.100  Further, 
                                                 
95 Id. at 372. 
96 Id.  Because the plaintiff died as a result of the virus, his estate continued the suit after 
his death.  Id.  Additionally, the donor died because of complications arising from the AIDS 
virus.  Id. 
97 Id.  At the trial court, the plaintiff sought an order to compel the identity of the AIDS-
infected donor.  Id.  The trial court granted disclosure upon the condition that the 
information remain confidential until the donor was named as a defendant.  Id.  According 
to WASH. REV. CODE § 70.54.120 (1987), negligence principles apply to determine whether 
those responsible for the blood transfusion may be civilly liable.  See generally In re Rogers 
v. Miles Labs., Inc., 116 Wn.2d 195 (Wash. 1991). 
98 Puget Sound, 819 P.2d at 373.  The court held that: 
(1) the statutory physician-patient privilege does not apply; (2) we will 
not consider whether there is a common law privilege because this 
argument was not presented to the trial court; (3) the interests of 
plaintiffs, defendant, and Donor X are competing and conflicting 
interests, but after identifying and weighing those interests, we do not 
find an abuse of discretion by the trial court; and (4) on this record we 
cannot decide the claim of privacy asserted on behalf of the deceased 
donor. 
Id. 
99 Id. at 375–76.  This right to access included the right to broad and extensive discovery.  
Id. 
100 Id. at 376.  The court conceded that disclosure of such information posed a threat to 
“family relationships, job security, employability and the ability to obtain credit, insurance 
and housing.”  Id.  However, the donor died, leaving the court to draw the conclusion that 
justifications for maintaining privacy were lost.  Id.  The blood center argued that the court 
should defer to the donor’s privacy right because the record addressed “extremely private 
and embarrassing matters” that Washington’s discovery rule could protect from disclosure.  
Id. at 377.  Because the record of the case did not provide insight regarding how the donor’s 
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the court was reluctant to accept the blood center’s policy arguments 
because the information asserted in support of the policy argument 
against disclosure was not in the record.101  However, the court 
addressed the public policy claim because of the possibility that privacy 
loss would cause an undue burden.102  The court conceded that an 
adequate blood supply was necessary and questioned the severity of the 
impact of disclosure in this particular instance, but the court reasoned 
that these policy claims were mere speculation and upheld the trial 
court’s order for disclosure.103   
In Doe v. Meachum,104 the District of Connecticut approached a 
discovery dispute in a slightly different fashion from the court deciding 
Puget Sound, promoting discovery and protecting privacy by ordering 
production of medical records subject to protective orders.105  In 
Meachum, a class of inmates of the Connecticut Department of 
Corrections asserted civil rights objections to the department’s policies 
                                                                                                             
information was used following his or her death, the court did not reach a final decision on 
the donor’s privacy right at stake.  Id. 
 The blood center also argued that the policy interest of maintaining an adequate blood 
supply outweighed the plaintiff’s interest, emphasizing the overall importance of keeping 
donor information confidential.  Id.  According to the court, asserting a public policy 
argument would be a valid basis for a judicial decision.  Id.  However, the court maintained 
that in making such a decision, it must clearly identify the “sources of facts or opinions” 
that provoked the decision.  Id.  Therefore, decisions based upon public policy must rely on 
the materials within the record of the case.  Id.  The blood center claimed that blood 
donation would decrease without protection from disclosure.  Id.  Also, the blood center 
argued that it already implemented cautious screening mechanisms that served the 
purpose of excluding donors with infectious diseases.  Id. 
101 Id. at 377–78.  Although the information may have been correct, the court would not 
accept this policy argument absent a strong indication within the record.  Id.  Also, the 
court indicated that certain aspects of the policy claim would have required an expert 
witness for support, but the record did not show that the witnesses were qualified as 
experts.  Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id.  The blood center identified the consequences of disclosure:  “(1) [D]onors will be 
less likely to donate blood if they know their identity may be disclosed and inquiries may 
be made about them, and (2) the possibility of disclosure will encourage donors to give 
false or inaccurate information when donating.”  Id. at 378.  In rejecting the blood center’s 
argument, the court countered that “the true public interest is an uninfected blood supply 
and therefore, public policy should discourage donors who are in high risk groups.”  Id. at 
379. 
 For a discussion and criticism of this decision that argued for a special protection of 
blood donors, see generally Ann Marie LoGerfo, Note, Protecting Donor Privacy in AIDS 
Related Blood Bank Litigation—Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Center, 117 Wash. 2d 772, 819 P.2d 
370 (1991), 67 WASH. L. REV. 981 (1992). 
104 126 F.R.D. 444 (D. Conn. 1989). 
105 Id. 
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regarding HIV-infected patients.106  In order to evaluate the treatment of 
these patients, the inmates requested medical records.107  One of the 
many production requests was for medical and mental health records of 
the HIV-infected inmates.108  As a result, the court addressed the extent 
of the HIV-infected inmates’ privacy rights, finding that the probative 
value of the material outweighed the privacy concern.109 
The court resolved the dispute in Meachum by evaluating four factors 
to determine whether a privacy privilege existed.110  The court carefully 
analyzed the first factor, addressing the necessity of disclosing the 
inmates’ identities and concluded that disclosure was necessary to the 
plaintiffs’ evaluation of the department’s policies.111  The court reasoned 
that the second and third factors, requiring the narrowest invasion of 
privacy possible, favored disclosure because both parties filed protective 
orders that would preclude public disclosure.112  Finally, the fourth 
element, asking whether the information was necessary and desirable, 
                                                 
106 Id. at 446.  As this was a class action suit, the defendants argued that Rule 23(d)(2) 
required consent from each class member to justify disclosure, but the court disagreed.  Id.  
The defendants asserted that without consent, the court must allow only some of the 
medical records in a redacted form.  Id. at 448–49.  In ultimately admitting the medical 
records, the court agreed somewhat with this argument, limiting the discovery to medical 
records pertaining to HIV-patient records only.  Id. at 449–50. 
107 Id. at 447–48.  The requests included lists of weekly blood drawings, incident reports, 
lab invoices, quarterly and annual reports, documents on hospitalization, and documents 
on suicides or attempted suicides.  Id. at 448. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 449–50. 
110 Id. at 449.  The plaintiffs began their argument by asserting that civil rights actions 
under a federal claim do not provide for claims of state statutory privilege.  Id.  In 
describing a previous civil rights claim in federal court, the court utilized a four-part test to 
determine whether a physician-patient privilege existed: 
First, is the identification of the individuals required for effective use 
of the data?  Second, is the invasion of privacy and risk of 
psychological harm being limited to the narrowest possible extent?  
Third, will the data be supplied only to qualified personnel under 
strict controls over confidentiality? Fourth, is the data necessary or 
simply desirable? 
Id. (quoting Lora v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of New York, 74 F.R.D. 565, 579 (E.D.N.Y. 
1977)). 
111 Id.  The court reasoned that the disease, transmitted through sexual conduct or shared 
needles, in conjunction with the approximation that were between 350 and 400 HIV-
infected inmates, would require the plaintiffs to be aware of the names of the individual 
inmates for proper analysis.  Id.  Identification would be necessary because the experts may 
need to track HIV-patients’ medical records over time and compare them with other 
patients.  Id. 
112 Id.  According to Connecticut’s district court, the protective orders would suffice to 
limit the harm of disclosure and the information would only be disclosed to the necessary 
personnel.  Id. 
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favored disclosure because the plaintiffs’ experts needed to analyze the 
data in the records to form a legal argument.113  Through this analysis, 
the court decided that full disclosure under a protective order was 
appropriate.114 
In Inmates of New York with HIV v. Cuomo,115 the Northern District of 
New York approached disclosure differently, deferring to the patients’ 
privacy interests while requiring disclosure of the medical records.116  
The plaintiffs, inmates of the New York correctional facilities, brought a 
class action civil rights claim, arguing that the commissioner of the New 
York Department of Correctional Services and the governor of New York 
violated their Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.117  
During discovery, the plaintiffs sought various HIV-infected inmates’ 
documents to examine the facility’s treatment.118  The defendants 
resisted, claiming that the federal right to privacy protected medical 
records from individually identifiable disclosure.119   
The court held the medical records to be relevant because this civil 
rights claim pertained to the manner in which the New York correctional 
facilities treated HIV-infected inmates.120  Thus, the Northern District of 
New York ordered limited disclosure of the medical records as well as an 
extension of the existing protective order.121  Specifically, the court 
required the defendants to compile and disclose information regarding 
HIV-infected inmates in the custody of the correctional department.122  
The court did not require disclosure of the names or identification 
numbers of those individuals, reasoning that identification of the 
patients was unnecessary to evaluate their treatment.123  Also, the court 
ordered the defendants to produce the information requested within the 
plaintiffs’ interrogatories and also to redact the documents to eliminate 
                                                 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 450. 
115 No. 90-CV-252, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1488 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 1991). 
116 Id. at *10. 
117 Id. at *1. 
118 Id. at *3–4.  The plaintiffs requested production of the names of all inmates infected 
with HIV, the names of inmates that have died of AIDS-related causes, the names of 
inmates receiving health services, the medical records for a specific HIV-patient, and the 
documents relating to two other inmates suffering from AIDS.  Id.  The plaintiffs sought the 
individual information of the patients, claiming that individual circumstances would be 
able to show problems in the prison health care system.  Id. at *5. 
119 Id. at *6. 
120 Id. at *1. 
121 Id. at *7. 
122 Id. at *10. 
123 Id. 
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any references to HIV-infected inmates.124  The protective order that the 
court implemented precluded the parties from disclosing information 
beyond the scope of the litigation and required that the parties keep the 
information separate from other evidentiary material.125  Thus, the court 
permitted discovery because the information was relevant and the 
protective orders maintained privacy.126 
Unlike Puget Sound, Meachum, and Cuomo, the Florida appellate court 
deciding South Florida Blood Service, Inc. v. Rasmussen127 granted immense 
deference to privacy concerns, prohibiting discovery of HIV-patient 
medical records.128  In Rasmussen, the plaintiff served the South Florida 
Blood Service (“SFBS”) with a subpoena for documents that disclosed the 
names and addresses of individual donors associated with his hospital 
records.129  In response, SFBS moved to quash the subpoena, or 
alternatively, impose a protective order, claiming that the plaintiff did 
not show good cause for the invasion of privacy.130   
The Florida appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision to 
order disclosure, highlighting the records’ lack of probative value.131  
                                                 
124 Id.  The court reasoned, once again, that the identifiable material was not relevant to 
the plaintiffs’ inquiry.  Id. at *11.  Furthermore, the court reasoned that the redaction would 
not preclude the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims.  Id. 
125 Id.  The protective order read as follows: 
[N]o confidential material ordered disclosed shall be revealed except 
to the parties’ attorneys and their staff, the parties’ expert witnesses, 
and then only so that they may prepare to testify at trial, and the court 
and its staff; all confidential material shall be segregated from other 
evidentiary material, identified as confidential, and be kept under seal 
when filed with the court. 
Id. 
126 See id. 
127 467 So. 2d 798 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). 
128 Id., aff’d sub nom. Rasmussen v. S. Fl. Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987).  The 
fact pattern in Rasmussen is similar to Puget Sound in that Rasmussen received a blood 
transfusion after an accident and subsequently contracted AIDS.  467 So. 2d at 800.  
Rasmussen died as a result, but a suit was instituted against the South Florida Blood 
Service (“SFBS”).  Id. 
129 467 So. 2d at 800. 
130 Id.  The trial court denied the motion and ordered production.  Id. 
131 Id. at 804.  The court described Florida’s discovery rule, which models the federal 
Rule: 
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.280 allows for discovery of any matter, 
not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter of the action.  The 
scope of this rule, while recognized as being broad, is not without 
limitation.  First, as the rule indicates, irrelevant and privileged matter 
is not subject to discovery.  Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(1).  Second, the 
discovery of relevant, non-privileged information may be limited or 
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Similar to the Washington Supreme Court’s reasoning in Puget Sound, 
the Florida appellate court evaluated the competing interests of the 
plaintiff, the privacy interest of the donors, and public policy to 
determine whether the plaintiff showed good cause for disclosure of the 
information.132  Addressing the plaintiff’s interest first, the court held 
that this information was not important to the claim that SFBS’s 
transfusion caused his transmission of HIV because none of the blood 
donors had HIV.133  Thus, the probative value of the evidence was weak 
and the court deemed the plaintiff’s interest in the material negligible.134   
Next, the court addressed the privacy interest of the donors, holding 
that this interest weighed heavily against Rasmussen’s interest in 
obtaining the records because of their personal nature.135  Furthermore, 
the court rejected the argument that discovery would dissuade those 
with HIV from donating blood due to the lack of privacy, reasoning that 
the role of discovery was not to achieve political or social goals.136  The 
court explained that if the information was relevant, the state would 
have a higher interest in including the information in order to achieve 
“fair and efficient resolution of disputes.”137   
In balancing these interests, the court considered public policy 
implications of disclosing the records, describing SFBS’s goal of 
providing an adequate blood supply.138  Despite its reluctance to defer to 
policy, the court accepted the policy argument favoring blood donation, 
recognizing that a breach in confidentiality might deter donation.139  
Ultimately, the court held that the circumstances required it to preclude 
                                                                                                             
prohibited in order to prevent annoyance, embarrassment, oppression 
or undue burden of expense. 
Id. at 801 (citations omitted). 
132 Id. at 801–04. 
133 Id. at 801. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 802.  The court reasoned that examination into the private details of the donors’ 
medical history, drug use, and sexual practices delves into areas protected by the 
fundamental right of privacy.  Id. 
136 Id.  The court stated that “[t]he Discovery Rules were not designed to achieve such 
goals, but to fairly and reasonably aid the litigation process.  It is for other agencies of 
government to act in detecting and preventing the spread of infectious diseases.”  Id. at 802, 
803 n.9.  In making decisions, the court asserted, trial courts must balance between the 
“interests served by the rules of discovery against the interests of the party seeking 
protection.”  Id. at 803. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 804. 
139 Id.  This argument is that donation will decrease if donors recognize the possibility 
that their medical information may be disclosed.  Id. 
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discovery.140  The court’s attention to relevance and the importance of 
privacy also appeared in disputes over the discovery of partial-birth 
abortion records, which is logical given the sensitive nature of both HIV 
and PBAB records.141 
2. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Challenges 
Recent controversy has sprung from Congress’ Partial Birth Abortion 
Ban,142 leading doctors, hospitals, the Planned Parenthood Federation of 
America, and the National Abortion Federation to challenge the ban’s 
                                                 
140 Id.  However, the court noted that this was a factual determination and that “we are 
not deciding that a blood bank’s records are immune from discovery in all cases.”  Id. 
141 See infra Part II.C.2 (setting forth four decisions pertaining to discovery of partial-birth 
abortion records within disputes over the constitutionality of the PBAB). 
142 On November 5, 2003, Congress enacted a prohibition of partial-birth abortions.  18 
U.S.C.A. § 1531; see also Nikki Katz, Partial Birth Abortion—Abortion Ban Issue, WOMEN’S 
ISSUES, http://womenissues.about.com/od/partialbirthabortion/i/ispartialbirth.htm (last 
visited Oct. 27, 2005) (describing the passing of this statute).  The vote in favor of this ban 
was 281-142 in the House of Representatives and 64-34 in the Senate.  Katz, supra.  This 
federal statute makes it a crime to perform a partial birth abortion, providing a definition 
for a partial-birth abortion.  18 U.S.C.A. § 1531(b)(1).  This particular section states: 
[T]he term “partial-birth abortion” means an abortion in which the 
person performing the abortion— 
(A) deliberately and intentionally vaginally delivers a living fetus 
until, in the case of a head-first presentation, the entire fetal head is 
outside the body of the mother, or, in the case of breech presentation, 
any part of the fetal trunk past the naval outside the body of the 
mother, for the purpose of performing an overt act that the person 
knows will kill the partially delivered living fetus; and 
(B) performs the overt act, other than completion of delivery, that kills 
the partially delivered living fetus. 
Id.  After analyzing evidence from previous state PBAB challenges, Congress reached the 
conclusion that there were no situations that required a partial-birth abortion to preserve 
the health of the mother.  Id., congressional findings.  Within these findings, Congress 
argued that evidence from the Stenberg trial showing that partial-birth abortions were 
never necessary was not included within the trial record because that information was not 
available until after the district court hearing occurred.  Id.  This information showed that 
this procedure is not within the realm of normal medical care.  Id.  Congress supported this 
conclusion by asserting that this procedure was generally disfavored throughout the 
country and that the “moral, medical, and ethical consensus” discouraged partial-birth 
abortions.  Id. 
 Congress further asserted that this procedure presented such serious health problems 
that twenty-seven states have banned the procedure.  Id.; see Douglas Johnson, The Partial-
Birth Abortion Ban Act—Misconceptions and Realities (2003), available at http://www.nrlc. 
org/abortion/pba/PBAall110403.html.  According to this article, reported partial-birth 
abortions in the year 2000 were between 2,200 and 5,000.  Johnson, supra.  For further 
discussion of the construction of partial-birth abortion bans, see Carolyn Bower, 
Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Statutory Restrictions on Partial-Birth 
Abortions, 76 A.L.R. 5th 637 (2004). 
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constitutionality.143  In every case, these advocates argue that the federal 
ban does not adhere to the Supreme Court’s previous decision listing 
how the government may ban partial-birth abortions.144  In Stenberg v. 
Carhart,145 the Supreme Court expressed that certain circumstances may 
exist that permit partial birth abortions, but that Nebraska’s partial-birth 
abortion ban posed an undue burden on women seeking abortions 
because it did not provide an exception in the ban to preserve the health 
of the mother.146  Because the federal partial-birth abortion statute does 
not provide an exception to preserve the health of the mother, these 
plaintiffs thus argue that it is unconstitutional.147  In cases where the 
plaintiffs question the constitutionality of the federal PBAB, the federal 
courts have addressed the discovery Rules differently, scrutinizing 
relevance, redaction, and protective orders in a manner that disfavored 
disclosure, using privacy concerns as the main justification.148     
In Northwestern Memorial Hospital v. Ashcroft,149 the Seventh Circuit 
granted deference to the party opposing admission of medical records.150  
                                                 
143 See Nw. Mem’l Hosp. v. Aschcroft, 362 F.3d 923 (7th Cir. 2004) (quashing a subpoena 
for medical records of a doctor who performed partial-birth abortions); Nat’l Abortion 
Fed’n v. Ashcroft, No. 03 Civ. 8695 (RCC), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4530 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 
2004) (granting the enforcement of a subpoena against a New York hospital for medical 
records); Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Ashcroft, No. 04-70658, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4491 (E.D. 
Mich. Mar. 12, 2004) (ordering the University of Michigan to comply with a subpoena for 
medical records); Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Ashcroft, No. C 03-4872 PJH, 2004 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3383 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2004) (denying discovery of medical records in 
light of patients’ privacy interests). 
144 See infra notes 145–47 and accompanying text. 
145 530 U.S. 914, 932 (2000). 
146 Id. 
147 See Nw. Mem’l, 362 F.3d 923; Nat’l Abortion Fed’n (N.Y.), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4530; 
Nat’l Abortion Fed’n (Mich.), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4491; Planned Parenthood, 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 3383; see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 1531.  Section 1531(a) states:  “This subsection does not 
apply to a partial-birth abortion that is necessary to save the life of a mother whose life is 
endangered.”  18 U.S.C.A. § 1531. 
148 See generally Nw. Mem’l, 362 F.3d 923; Planned Parenthood, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3383. 
149 362 F.3d 923 (7th Cir. 2004). 
150 Id.  The government appealed the district court’s decision to quash a subpoena under 
Rule 45(c) that requested production of medical records from a doctor who performed two 
types of partial-birth abortions.  Id. at 924.  The district court reasoned that HIPAA barred 
the production of the records, but the court of appeals disagreed.  Id.  The district court 
described that the Illinois statute regarding medical records preempted the HIPAA 
regulations, and because the Illinois statute did not allow even redacted medical records to 
be disclosed, discovery was barred.  Id. at 925.  The Seventh Circuit disagreed with the 
district court on this point, asserting that HIPAA regulations cannot impose state privileges 
under federal law.  Id. at 926.  Furthermore, the court pointed out that the HIPAA 
preemption regulation applies only to individually identifiable health information.  Id.  
Thus, when individual information is redacted, state law preemption would not be 
appropriate.  Id. 
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The Seventh Circuit criticized the district court’s attempt to create a 
federal common law privilege for abortion records that would preclude 
discovery.151  In fact, the Seventh Circuit stated that a federal common 
law privilege for abortion patients would be highly inappropriate 
because courts are “reluctant to embark on a case-by-case determination 
of the relative sensitivity of medical records of different ailments or 
procedures.”152   
Despite this criticism, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s decision to deny discovery, hinging its reasoning upon the lack of 
relevance and the ineffectiveness of redaction.153  Moreover, the Seventh 
Circuit upheld the district court’s decision that the harm of the privacy 
infringement outweighed the medical records’ probative value, 
determining that the government lacked a convincing argument that the 
medical records would assist in impeaching the plaintiff’s expert 
witness.154    
                                                 
151 Id. 
152 Id.  The Seventh Circuit recognized that many other types of records, such as HIV 
records, are as sensitive as records for partial-birth abortions.  Id.  Therefore, utilizing 
different approaches to privilege for different types of medical records would result in 
“arbitrary line drawing.”  Id. 
153 Id. at 927.  Judge Posner asserted that the hospital claimed that the records lacked 
probative value and that the admission would cause a privacy loss to the patients.  Id.  He 
reasoned that the government only replied in generalities as to the relevance of the 
information, “to the point of being evasive.”  Id.  However, the government did make the 
argument that the records may provide information to impeach the doctor that performed 
the partial-birth abortions, but the Seventh Circuit did not find this reason probative 
enough.  Id. 
154 Id.  The court stated: 
At the oral argument we pressed the government’s lawyer repeatedly 
and hard for indications of what he hoped to learn from the hospital 
records, and drew a blank. . . .  The lawyer did suggest that if 
Hammond testified that patients with leukemia are better off with the 
D & X procedure than with the conventional D & E procedure but the 
medical records indicate that not all abortion patients with leukemia 
undergo D & X abortions, this would both impeach Hammond and 
suggest that D & X is not the only medically safe abortion procedure 
available to pregnant women with leukemia.  But such information 
would be unlikely to be found in Hammond’s records, given his 
strongly expressed preference for using the D & X method in the case 
of patients with fragile health. 
Id.  It is helpful to note that the government, in the Reply Brief for Appellant, did assert the 
reason for requesting the physician’s medical records.  Reply Brief for Appellant at 9–10, 
Nw. Mem’l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362. F.3d 923 (7th Cir. 2004).  The government asserted in its 
brief that the physicians that challenged the PBAB pinpointed situations where partial-
birth abortions were necessary to protect the health of the mother, which would support 
their contention that the PBAB is unconstitutional.  Id. 
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Although the government sought a limited number of records in 
redacted form, the Seventh Circuit was not convinced that expunging the 
identifiable information would preserve the patients’ privacy.155  The 
Seventh Circuit reasoned that women who underwent partial-birth 
abortions were subjected to hostility and that it was probable that their 
identities would be revealed through investigations over the Internet.156  
Furthermore, the court asserted that despite complete redaction, 
discovery would invade the women’s privacy, comparing the disclosure 
of the partial-birth abortion records to the distribution of nude pictures 
over the Internet without consent.157  The Seventh Circuit showed great 
concern for the patients’ privacy, readdressing the Government’s 
responsibility to show the probative value of the records and criticizing 
its vague responses to inquiries regarding the use of the records.158   
                                                                                                             
 Specifically, Dr. Hammond made various statements regarding his performance of the 
procedure.  Id.  For example, he stated that he remembered one patient whose life was not 
threatened but whose condition required the procedure.  Id.  The government argued that 
because Dr. Hammond relied upon his past personal performances of the abortions, the 
government should be able to “probe its basis just as any defendant [was] entitled to probe 
the basis of assertions made by a plaintiff to support his complaint.”  Id.  Additionally, the 
government pointed out that the only records it sought were those where Dr. Hammond 
performed the now illegal procedure.  Id. at 11.  The government concluded its relevancy 
argument in its reply brief by stating: 
To meaningfully challenge these assertions, the Government’s experts 
must be able to consider the underlying cases to which he refers and 
the medical basis for his decision to use the banned procedure.  
Without that opportunity, any competing opinions would be 
hopelessly theoretical.  Nor can the Government resort to the 
“available medical literature” for the simple reason that it does not 
exist on either side of the medical necessity debate. 
Id. 
155 Nw. Mem’l, 362 F.3d at 929. 
156 Id.  The court reasoned that the women were afraid that people would be able to sift 
through the information contained in the trial record addressing their medical and sex 
history and thereby decipher who they were from the information.  Id.  The court 
determined that the summaries the women provided of their histories may be sufficient for 
identification.  Id. 
157 Id.  The court also addressed the hospital’s interest at stake, concluding that it would 
be against the hospital’s interest to allow invasion of its patients’ privacy.  Id. 
158 Id. at 929–30.  The court reasoned: 
The government has had repeated opportunities to articulate a use for 
the records that it seeks, and it has failed to do so.  What it would like 
to prove at the trial in New York, to refute Dr. Hammond, is that D & 
E is always an adequate alternative, from the standpoint of a pregnant 
woman’s health, to the D & X procedure.  But the government has 
failed to explain how the record of a D & X abortion would show this. 
Id. at 930.  In justifying the demands that the court made of the government, the Seventh 
Circuit stated that “Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(c) allows the fish to object, and when they do so the 
fisherman has to come up with more than the government has been able to do in this case 
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The first district court that addressed medical record discovery 
within the challenge to the PBAB followed the Seventh Circuit’s 
reasoning.159  In Planned Parenthood of America v. Ashcroft,160 the Northern 
                                                                                                             
despite the excellence of its lawyers.”  Id. at 931.  Essentially, because the government did 
not show precedent where an expert witness’ medical records were used to impeach the 
witness, its argument for probative value was unconvincing.  Id. 
 A strong dissent written by Judge Manion followed this opinion, criticizing the 
majority’s HIPAA preemption, privacy, and probative value analyses.  Id. at 933–40 
(Manion, J., dissenting).  First, in criticizing the majority’s HIPAA analysis regarding 
individually-identifiable material, the dissenting opinion set forth all the information that 
must be redacted in order to satisfy HIPAA requirements presented in 45 C.F.R. 
§ 164.514(b)(2)(i).  Id. at 934.  Judge Manion described this regulation to show that once this 
redaction occurs, HIPAA’s privacy concerns have been fulfilled and the patients should not 
be able to claim a privacy violation due to the disclosure.  Id. at 935.  Because the majority 
discounted this point, argued Judge Manion, the decision derails HIPAA’s policy.  Id. at 
939.  The majority chose to conclude that the discovery order would subject an undue 
burden upon the patients because of the privacy cost.  Id. at 935.  Because the women 
would not know whose records the government sought, the privacy concern diminished.  
Id. at 936.  The dissent made this conclusion based on the Supreme Court case, Reproductive 
Service, Inc. v. Walker, 439 U.S. 1307 (1978), which enforced a subpoena for medical records 
if the patients’ names were redacted and a protective order was established.  Id. 
 Further, the dissent criticized the majority’s conclusion that little or no probative 
value existed in the records that the government sought.  Id.  The dissent described that the 
government actually requested information from both D & X and D & E procedures, which 
would be probative regarding the necessity of the partial-birth abortions under certain 
circumstances.  Id. at 937.  To also support the probative value of the medical records, the 
dissent pointed out that the expert whose records the government sought planned to testify 
regarding the safety of D & X over D & E partial-birth abortions.  Id.  Therefore, the dissent 
argued that this information was relevant not only to impeach the expert witness, but also 
to address the partial-birth abortions generally, and the majority should not have made an 
initial determination that the records were not probative enough for discovery.  Id. 
159 See infra text accompanying notes 161–64.  Currently, the Seventh Circuit is the only 
appellate court to decide appeals regarding the admittance of medical records in the PBAB 
challenges, and this decision proved newsworthy.  Coffin, supra note 87 (presenting a 
strong criticism to the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning); Patricia Manson, 7th Circuit Upholds 
Ruling to Protect Patients’ ID’s, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Mar. 29, 2004, available at LEXIS, News & 
Business File; Patients Have No Interest in Redacted Records, FED. DISCOVERY NEWS, Apr. 16, 
2004, available at LEXIS, News & Business File (describing Judge Manion’s dissenting 
opinion to Northwestern Memorial); Patients’ Privacy Interests Thwart Bid to Wrest Abortion 
Records from Illinois Hospital, FED. DISCOVERY NEWS, Apr. 16, 2004, available at LEXIS, News 
& Business File (outlining the majority’s holding and reasoning). 
 However, various district courts throughout the country have decided this discovery 
issue.  Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Ashcroft, No. 03 Civ. 8695 (RCC), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4530 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2004); Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Ashcroft, No. 04-70658, 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 4491 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 12, 2004); Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 
No. C 03-4872 PJH, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3383 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2004).  The decisions 
differ, so the circuit courts’ analyses of the “issues at stake” will hold significant precedence 
regarding the use of redacted medical records due to a possible Supreme Court decision 
regarding medical records and ultimately the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban.  See 
generally infra Part III. 
160 No. C 03-4872 PJH, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3383 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2004). 
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District of California denied discovery.161  The court held that the 
government’s motions to compel should be denied because the records 
were irrelevant, unduly burdensome, and the individual patients’ 
privacy rights outweighed the government’s interest in disclosure.162  
The California district court reasoned that the records were not relevant 
because the information the government sought was not within the 
records, and even if some information were relevant, the records would 
be marginally relevant at best.163  Finally, the court concluded that 
redaction of all individually identifiable material nevertheless contained 
information that could result in identification.164   
Conversely, the Eastern District of Michigan required production of 
the medical records in National Abortion Federation v. Ashcroft,165 applying 
a method of reasoning similar to the HIV-patient cases.166  In National 
Abortion Federation, the government served the University of Michigan 
Health System with a subpoena for medical records.167  Because the 
government did not seek discovery of the patients’ residencies and 
because the government asserted a need for this information to prepare a 
                                                 
161 Id. at *3.  In preparation for litigation, the government sought four types of records: 
(1) records of “partial-birth abortions” or PBAs, as defined by the 
government; (2) records of abortions involving the use of chemical 
injections to effect intrauterine fetal demise; (3) any abortions during 
which complications arose; and (4) documents related to medical 
malpractice claims arising out of the performance of PBAs. 
Id. 
162 Id. at *4.  The court additionally stated that any one of the reasons for denial was alone 
sufficient to deny the government’s motions to compel.  Id. at *4–5. 
163 Id. at *5.  Further, the court reasoned that the production would be unduly 
burdensome because of the “enormity of the requests” within a short period of time.  Id. 
164 Id. at *6.  Such information that may result in identification includes “types of 
contraception, sexual abuse or rape, marital status, and the presence of sexually 
transmitted diseases.”  Id.  Also, the court requested that the government withdraw the 
Rule 45 subpoenas to non-parties for production of their medical records because they 
would likely be denied as well.  Id. at *7.  Following this order denying the government’s 
motion, the district court ruled that the PBAB was unconstitutional.  Planned Parenthood 
Fed’n of Am. v. Aschcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 1034–35 (N.D. Cal. 2004).  The court 
concluded: 
[T]he Act is unconstitutional because it (1) poses an undue burden on a 
woman’s ability to choose a second trimester abortion; (2) is 
unconstitutionally vague; and (3) requires a health exception as set 
forth by the Supreme Court in Stenberg.  Permanent injunctive relief is 
appropriate given that plaintiffs have demonstrated that the Act 
violates their constitutional rights on the above three bases. 
Id. 
165 No. 04-70658, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4491 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 12, 2004). 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at *1. 
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defense to the PBAB, the court ordered production of the materials.168  
However, the court required that the University of Michigan redact 
individually identifiable information from the records according to the 
protective order.169  Also, the court formulated a protective order 
allowing the University of Michigan to label the information as 
confidential.170  Finally, the court required that the government limit its 
use of the information to trial preparation.171 
In the latest district court decision that applied a similar reasoning to 
Michigan’s district court, the government sought medical records during 
discovery in National Abortion Federation v. Ashcroft.172  The Government 
moved to enforce a Rule 45 subpoena against the New York Presbyterian 
Hospital for the physician-plaintiffs’ medical records of their partial-
birth abortion patients.173  After the government issued the subpoena, the 
court issued a protective order for the redaction of all individually 
identifiable material from the medical records.174  Despite the redaction 
order, the hospital claimed that redaction would not satisfy HIPAA 
requirements.175  HIPAA preempted New York law with respect to the 
use of medical records, and HIPAA did not provide for an absolute 
privilege of medical records because the redaction requirements and 
                                                 
168 Id. at *2. 
169 Id. at *3.  The court framed the order, stating: 
[T]he University of Michigan (i) shall redact all patient identifying 
information from the records to be produced, as defined in the 
Protective Order entered in the underlying matter . . .  and (ii) may 
further redact from those records information identifying the states of 
residence of any individual who has sought or obtained medical 
treatment from the University of Michigan. 
Id. 
170 Id.  “The University of Michigan may designate as ‘Confidential Health Information’ 
any record(s) produced pursuant to this order, or any portion(s) of any record(s) produced, 
and such designation shall render the designated record(s) subject to the protective order 
governing disclosure of such information.”  Id. 
171 Id.; see Mich. Court OK’s Federal Access of University Hospital’s Abortion Records, FED. 
DISCOVERY NEWS, Apr. 16, 2004, available at LEXIS, News & Business File. 
172 No. 03 Civ. 8695 (RCC), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4530 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2004). 
173 Id. at *2. 
174 Id. at *4. 
175 Id. at *5.  The court analyzed HIPAA’s requirements to determine whether, as the 
plaintiffs asserted, New York law applied regarding the use of medical records.  Id.  The 
court pointed out that protected health information was “individually identifiable health 
information transmitted or maintained in any form or medium.”  Id. at *7.  According to 
HIPAA, protective orders must prevent the use of the information beyond the litigation 
and either return or destroy the records following the litigation.  Id. at *8.  The court 
concluded that New York law did not apply because Congress did not intend to allow 
more stringent state regulations to apply alongside federal law.  Id. at *17. 
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protective orders eliminated privacy concerns.176  Thus, the Southern 
District of New York decided that these measures sufficed to protect 
partial-birth abortion patients’ privacy, enforcing the subpoena.177 
In viewing the two categories of cases, the discovery Rules the courts 
have applied are essentially identical in terms of language and intent.178  
Additionally, HIV and partial-birth abortion records are comparable in 
terms of the social consequences associated with public disclosure of the 
records and the fact that the privacy interest in all medical records is not 
absolute.179  Hence, it is disconcerting that those courts’ applications of 
the discovery Rules differ significantly from one another.  
III.  UNDESIRED AMBIGUITY FLOWING FROM DISCOVERY DECISIONS 
Now, as fond fathers, 
Having bound up the threat’ning twigs of birch, 
Only to stick it in their children’s sight 
For terror, not to use, in time the rod 
[Becomes] more mock’d than fear’d180 
Concern for consistency in discovery Rule application requires 
reconciliation between the HIV-patient cases and two of the recent PBAB 
challenges.181  The Advisory Committee drafting the Rules intended that 
courts apply them in a flexible and even-handed manner despite any 
political issues involved.182  However, recent decisions considering the 
                                                 
176 Id. at *21–22. 
177 Id.  The court also addressed whether disclosure placed an undue burden upon the 
hospital, concluding that there was no Rule 45(c) claim.  Id. at *23.  The hospital claimed 
that the disclosure would force it to deal with an increase in anger and mistrust as well as 
damage to its reputation.  Id.  The court disagreed, stating that production would not hurt 
the hospital’s reputation because the court caused the production, not the hospital.  Id.  In 
August of 2004, the Southern District of New York granted the plaintiffs a permanent 
injunction, enjoining enforcement of the PBAB.  Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Ashcroft, 330. F. 
Supp. 2d 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
178 See also FED. R. CIV. P. 45.  Compare WASH. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 26 with FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.280 
with FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b). 
179 Compare supra note 86 and accompanying text with supra note 87 and accompanying 
text (describing respectively the social consequences associated with living with HIV or 
having a partial-birth abortion). 
180 SHAKESPEARE, supra note 1, at act 1, sc. 3, ll.23–27.  According to Vincentio, the 
population has begun to mock rather than follow the laws as children mock their parents’ 
rules because they merely threaten punishment.  Id. 
181 See infra Parts III.A–B. 
182 See supra note 30 (quoting the Advisory Committee’s note recognizing that social 
concerns may be present in discovery disputes, but that courts should apply the rules 
equally). 
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admissibility of medical records do not apply the even-handed 
approach, causing confusion and inconsistent decisions.183  These 
inconsistent decisions exemplify the tension that Vincentio faced in 
Measure for Measure when he realized that Angelo committed a crime for 
which he sentenced others to death.184  Thus, to avoid inconsistent and 
unjust law enforcement, Vincentio substituted Angelo’s unjust decisions 
with flexible law application.185   
Courts’ analyses of relevance and the undue burden of privacy 
infringement within two of the PBAB challenges demonstrate inflexible 
Rule application resulting from a lack of neutrality.186  Hence, a 
comparison between the admissibility of HIV-patients’ medical records 
and partial-birth abortion patients’ records illustrates the current 
contradiction between the discovery Rules’ intent and application.187  
Part III.A addresses the inconsistency between the HIV-patient cases and 
the PBAB challenges regarding the analysis of relevant material.188  Part 
III.B expounds the second point of significant ambiguity between these 
two types of cases, which is the reasoning pertaining to privacy, 
protective orders, and redaction.189   
A. Conflicting Relevance Applications 
Whereas cases addressing the admissibility of HIV-patients’ medical 
records analyze relevance according to the intent behind the discovery 
Rules, two PBAB challenges address relevancy in a detrimental manner 
                                                 
183 See infra Parts III.A–B. 
184 SHAKESPEARE, supra note 1, at act 2, sc. 1.  Escalus, an ancient Lord representing the 
scales of justice, attempted to dissuade Angelo from imposing the death penalty.  Id.  He 
describes the criminal’s character and that, because others have committed this act, the law 
should grant mercy in this situation.  Id.  Later, Vincentio decides to replace Angelo, 
issuing punishments that reflect the seriousness of the crimes.  Id. at act 5, sc. 1, ll.525–30.  
Rather than putting men to death for committing sexual acts outside of marriage, Vincentio 
makes each man marry the woman he impregnated.  Id. 
185 Id. 
186 See infra Parts III.A–B. 
187 See infra Parts III.A–B. 
188 See infra Part III.A. 
189 See infra Part III.B.  In both the HIV-patient cases and the PBAB challenges, the undue 
burden that parties claim as a challenge to discovery is that disclosure of the medical 
records infringes their fundamental right to privacy.  See supra Parts II.C.1–2.  Part III.B 
describes the inconsistency between the manner in which courts address privacy 
infringement in light of protective orders and redaction by comparing Puget Sound, 
Meachum, Cuomo, and Rasmussen with Northwestern Memorial Hospital, Planned Parenthood 
Federation, National Abortion Federation (Mich.), and National Abortion Federation (N.Y.).  See 
infra Part III.B. 
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with respect to the requesting party.190  Arguably, this disparity is due to 
a lack of neutrality in Rule application.191   
For instance, in Meachum, the court questioned whether the HIV-
patients’ medical records were necessary and desirable to the civil rights 
claim in the correctional facility, aptly requiring disclosure of the medical 
records.192  The Connecticut district court recognized the attenuated 
relationship between the medical records and the legal argument, but the 
court followed the Rules’ intent for extensive discovery by ordering 
disclosure of the materials.193  In this situation, the district court deciding 
Meachum illustrated that it was unnecessary for the medical records to be 
admissible at trial for parties to examine them during discovery.194  Here, 
the court correctly utilized the flexibility that Rule 26 permits regarding 
relevance and thus provided a clear example of the intended application 
of Rules of discovery.195 
Relevance was also an aspect of the Northern District of New York’s 
analysis in Cuomo, which eventually limited discovery of HIV-patients’ 
records.196  In this decision, the district court properly recognized that 
the outer limit of relevance was the “subject matter involved in the 
action,” reflecting the Rules’ intent to permit extensive discovery and 
fostering fully developed claims.197  The court handled the irrelevance of 
                                                 
190 See infra text accompanying 206–30 (analyzing the manner in which the courts 
deciding Northwestern Memorial and Planned Parenthood addressed the issue of relevance). 
191 See Nw. Mem’l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 933–40 (7th Cir. 2004) (Manion, J., 
dissenting) (asserting that the majority inappropriately declared an opinion on the 
probative value of the medical records). 
192 Doe v. Meachum, 126 F.R.D. 444, 449 (D. Conn. 1989). 
193 Id. (reasoning that experts analyzing the treatment in the correctional facilities would 
need to identify the patients in order to study treatment over time). 
194 See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text (describing that the standard for 
relevance is whether the material desired is “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery 
of admissible evidence”).  Expert analysis of the records would make the medical records 
relevant to the case so the inability to use the raw records at trial did not preclude 
discovery.  Meachum, 126 F.R.D. at 449.  Due to the fact that the party seeking discovery 
successfully showed good cause, the Connecticut district court permitted discovery.  Id. 
195 See supra note 33 (describing that relevance should include information relevant to the 
subject matter on a showing of good cause); supra note 36 (citing an Advisory Committee 
note asserting the importance of applying the relevance standard flexibly). 
196 Inmates of N.Y. with HIV v. Cuomo, No. 90-CV-252, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1488, at *7, 
*10 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 1991) (reasoning that identifiable material on the medical records was 
not relevant to the legal claim, requiring redaction and a protective order). 
197 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) advisory committee’s note (2000).  The Advisory Committee’s note 
describes that a gray line exists between information that is relevant to the claims of the 
particular suit and information that is relevant only to the subject matter of the action.  Id.  
Because the latter may lead to claims or defenses eventually arising in an action, relevant 
material may be defined in terms of information that is relevant to the claim as well as the 
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the identifiable records not by precluding discovery, but by ordering 
redaction and a protective order.  In doing so, the New York district 
court utilized Rule 26(c) protective orders, permitting the plaintiffs to 
examine the correctional facility in order to successfully proceed with 
their civil rights claims.198  By refusing to question whether the 
substantive material within the medical records would be highly 
probative, the court recognized that this information could possibly lead 
to a legal claim, appreciating that Rule 26 requires only minimal 
relevance to permit discovery.199  This approach provided an appropriate 
balance between protecting privacy and promoting access to the courts, 
which the Rules intend and the Supreme Court has reinforced.200  Similar 
to the court in Meachum, the court deciding Cuomo posed another 
suitable Rule application by limiting discovery to all possible relevant 
information. 
Unlike Meachum and Cuomo, in Rasmussen the court held that 
identification of donors that most likely did not have HIV was irrelevant, 
deferring to the Rules.201  The court’s reasoning was consistent with 
Meachum and Cuomo because in Rasmussen, the plaintiff did not meet 
Rule 26’s initial relevance requirement, as the plaintiff wished to 
examine records that were void of HIV information in order to develop a 
claim against an individual with HIV.202  Thus, the Florida appellate 
court deciding Rasmussen recognized that a party may not cross the outer 
limit of relevance in discovery requests, promoting Rule 26’s intended 
goal to achieve extensive discovery of relevant claims.203  Based on these 
flexible interpretations of the discovery Rules, an instance where the 
                                                                                                             
subject matter of the suit.  Id.  There was no foreseeable need for the inmates’ identification 
within the subject matter of the claim because the legal claim referred to the general 
treatment of inmates.  Cuomo, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1488, at *10. 
198 Id. 
199 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) (permitting discovery of all relevant material). 
200 See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979) (limiting discovery in order to avoid 
“annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense” after the parties 
attempt to resolve the dispute); supra note 48 and accompanying text (setting forth the 
protective orders the Rules encourage). 
201 S. Fla. Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 801–04 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) 
(holding that information pertaining to donors to SFBS was not relevant because it did not 
help to prove from where the deceased plaintiff contracted HIV). 
202 Id. at 801 (describing that disclosure would not help the plaintiff to locate the 
individual that caused his contraction of HIV). 
203 Id. (determining that because the medical records did not even apply to the general 
subject matter of the case, which was to hold the individual who infected Rasmussen with 
HIV responsible, the material was not relevant). 
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relevance requirement was not fulfilled would likely be an obvious 
harassment attempt, permitting the court to preclude discovery.204 
Two of the PBAB challenges have approached relevancy differently, 
straying from the intent of the Rules of discovery and causing confusion 
as to the correct approach that courts should take in determining 
relevancy of discovery requests.205  Specifically, in Northwestern Memorial, 
the Seventh Circuit’s holding that the government failed to show that the 
medical records were relevant contradicted the intent and prior 
application of the Rules of discovery.206   
The Seventh Circuit’s approach was flawed because, rather than 
merely deciding whether the government showed that there was a 
possibility that the medical records could produce admissible evidence, 
the court questioned whether the medical records would have significant 
impeachment value at trial.207  Even if this prior determination was 
appropriate, the dissenting opinion as well as the government’s Reply 
Brief described how the information would be relevant to impeach an 
expert witness and to address partial-birth abortions, demonstrating that 
the Seventh Circuit disregarded Rule 26’s low relevance standard.208  
                                                 
204 See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text (describing that the Rules’ intent is to 
confine the outer limit of discovery to information relevant to the subject matter of the 
dispute). 
205 See infra text accompanying notes 208–24 (assessing and criticizing the decisions in 
Northwestern Memorial and California’s Planned Parenthood because the reasoning strayed 
from the language and intent of the Rules); see also Coffin, supra note 87 (“[T]he court 
demanded that the government satisfy a heightened standard of relevance never before 
seen in the law.”). 
206 362 F.3d 923, 927, 929 (7th Cir. 2004) (reasoning that the government’s suggestion that 
medical records would be used for impeachment was insufficient because, according to the 
court, the desired information was “unlikely to be found” in the medical records).  But see 
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (describing that information relevant to the subject matter of the 
controversy should fulfill the relevancy requirement for discovery as long as the proponent 
of discovery shows good cause). 
207 See supra notes 36–37 (setting forth that the good cause requirement for discovery is 
flexible and that a party may fulfill the relevancy requirement for discovery by showing 
that the material is “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence”). 
208 Nw. Mem’l, 362 F.3d at 933–40 (Manion, J., dissenting) (reasoning that the information 
had a higher probative value than the majority admitted because the medical records 
would address the safety of two abortion procedures, which could be used for impeaching 
the expert witness and to address the validity of the PBAB); Reply Brief for Appellant at 9–
10, Nw. Mem’l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923 (7th Cir. 2004) (setting forth the 
government’s argument for justifying that the information within the medical records 
would be relevant to its case); see also supra note 36 and accompanying text (describing the 
2000 Advisory Committee’s reasoning that the standard for relevance should be flexible 
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Reasonable minds differed as to whether the information was relevant to 
the subject matter or claims of the controversy, which should have 
weighed in favor of discovery due to the intent for broad discovery.209  
Thus, the court did not follow the flexible nature of Rule 26 when it 
prohibited discovery of the medical records, precluding the trier of fact 
from making the ultimate decision concerning the relevance of the 
medical records.210 
The Northern District of California’s decision in Planned Parenthood 
offers another example of faltered reasoning pertaining to the relevance 
of medical records in a PBAB challenge.211  The Northern District of 
California placed an unnecessarily heavy burden upon the government 
to show relevance, which was inconsistent with the language and the 
application of Rule 26.212  The court’s sole explanation that the 
information the government sought would not be within the desired 
records was unsound.213  The information was relevant to the partial-
birth abortion procedure.214  Therefore, a reasonable basis existed for the 
government to request the information, which arguably satisfied Rule 
26’s relevance requirement.215  Although courts may consider the 
probative value of discovery against the burden it would place upon the 
parties producing the material, this court reasoned that low relevance 
alone would preclude discovery, which misconstrued Rule 26’s intent to 
make the burden of proving relevance low.216   
                                                                                                             
and that “information that could be used to impeach a likely witness, although not 
otherwise relevant to the claims or defenses, might be properly discoverable”). 
209 See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (asserting that courts should 
interpret relevance broad enough to include information that is likely to become an issue in 
the litigation). 
210 See id. 
211 No. C 03-4872 PJH, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3383, at *4–7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2004) 
(denying discovery of partial-birth abortion records). 
212 Id. at *4–5 (asserting that the marginal relevance alone would be sufficient to deny 
discovery of the medical records).  But see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) (permitting discovery for all 
relevant material). 
213 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *4–5 (describing the information that the government sought, 
which referred only to partial-birth abortion records); see supra note 34 and accompanying 
text (describing the 2000 Advisory Committee’s decision that if the proponent of discovery 
provides a legal argument that the information is relevant to the subject matter of the claim, 
then that party has fulfilled the relevance requirement of Rule 26). 
214 Planned Parenthood, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3383, at *3. 
215 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b). 
216 Planned Parenthood, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3383, at *4 (reasoning that irrelevance, undue 
burden, or the balance between privacy rights, as well as the probative value of the 
information alone would have precluded discovery). 
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Furthermore, the Northern District of California’s statement in 
Planned Parenthood that the information was “marginally relevant” 
should not have precluded discovery, given that Rule 26 only requires 
that the information lead to admissible evidence.217  As a result of this 
determination, the government could not examine records that 
addressed problematic partial-birth abortions.218  Thus, the government 
was unable to form possible arguments that would defend the PBAB’s 
findings that this procedure is never necessary to sustain the health of 
the mother.219 
Reconciling the approaches applied in HIV-patient cases and two of 
the PBAB challenges regarding the relevance of medical records is 
difficult.220  Although the Rules of discovery should be applied equally, 
independent of underlying politics, it seems as though courts deciding 
the PBAB disputes placed a higher burden on the government for 
relevancy than the courts deciding whether to admit HIV-patients’ 
medical records.221  Requiring a higher relevance burden in PBAB 
challenges is illogical, given the equivalent desire to keep these records 
private due to the social stigmas attached to both record types.222  
Moreover, little difference exists in the role of each type of record in 
litigation, given that the purpose of attaining each type of record is to 
evaluate medical procedures and treatment generally.223 
                                                 
217 See id. at *5.  But see supra note 36 and accompanying text (describing that information 
only related to the subject matter of the dispute was to be considered relevant). 
218 See generally Planned Parenthood,  2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3383. 
219 See supra note 142 (setting forth congressional findings regarding partial-birth 
abortions). 
220 See infra text accompanying notes 222–30 (addressing the inconsistencies between the 
decisions). 
221 FED. R. CIV. P. advisory committee’s note (1983) (asserting the need for the Rules’ 
application to occur in an even-handed manner). 
222 Compare supra note 86 (describing the social problems that HIV and AIDS patients 
face), with supra note 87 (setting forth the social stigmas associated with partial-birth 
abortion patients). 
223 Compare Inmates of N.Y. with HIV v. Cuomo, No. 90-CV-252, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
1488, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 1991) (stating that the purpose obtaining medical records of 
HIV patients was to evaluate the correctional facility to support a civil rights claim), and 
Doe v. Meachum, 126 F.R.D. 444, 446 (D. Conn. 1989) (describing that the plaintiffs sought 
medical records as a part of the evaluation of the correctional facility), and Doe v. Puget 
Sound Blood Center, 819 P.2d 370, 372 (Wash. 1991) (discussing that the purpose of 
obtaining the medical records was to strengthen a negligence claim and form a claim 
against the blood donor), and S. Fla. Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 801 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (also discussing the intent to strengthen the negligence claim against 
the blood center and blood donor), with Reply Brief for Appellant at 9–10, Nw. Mem’l 
Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating the government’s position that 
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Another illogical difference lies in the fact that discovery decisions 
rarely address relevance at all.224  The decisions pertaining to HIV 
medical records rarely addressed relevancy, and when the court did 
raise a question of relevance, it analyzed specifically whether identifiable 
material was necessary and did not attempt to determine the relevance 
of the medical records generally.225  However, the discovery decisions 
within the PBAB challenges questioned whether the substantive material 
that the government requested would be relevant to its argument.226  
Essentially, the courts prohibiting discovery of partial-birth abortion 
records required the government to provide a legal argument regarding 
the medical records before the government would be able to view them, 
which Rule 26 does not require.227  Arguably, if the government had the 
ability to formulate a strong legal argument, this information would not 
be necessary; however, as the government argued, it could not 
effectively defend the PBAB without examination of the medical 
records.228  Thus, it seems that the Seventh Circuit and the Northern 
District of California did not remain neutral because they granted greater 
deference to patients’ privacy concerns, despite the relevance of the 
material and the availability of redaction and protective orders that 
function to maintain privacy.229 
                                                                                                             
obtaining the medical records would be relevant and essential to evaluate whether the 
partial-birth abortion would be necessary beyond the findings of Congress within the 
PBAB). 
224 See generally Puget Sound, 819 P.2d 370.  In the court’s reasoning, it never questioned 
the medical records’ relevance to the dispute.  Id. 
225 See Meachum, 126 F.R.D. at 449–50.  The court’s reasoning did not question the 
relevance of the medical records.  Id.  Also, the relevance discussion in Cuomo was quickly 
resolved and the court did not question whether the records were relevant, only whether 
patients’ identities were relevant.  1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1488, at *1, *7, *10–11. 
226 In Planned Parenthood, the court questioned whether the medical records were more 
than “marginally relevant.”  No. C 03-4872 PJH, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3383, at *4–7 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 5, 2004). 
227 See Reply Brief for Appellant at 9–10, Nw. Mem’l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923 (7th 
Cir. 2004) (stating that the government needed to examine the records in order to 
effectively determine the merit of Dr. Hammond’s arguments that the partial-birth abortion 
was necessary to protect the health of the mother).  Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) (allowing 
discovery of all relevant material), with Nw. Mem’l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 927, 929 
(7th Cir. 2004) (reasoning that the government could not articulate a purpose for examining 
the medical records). 
228 See Reply Brief for Appellant at 9–10, Nw. Mem’l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923 (7th 
Cir. 2004). 
229 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (setting forth numerous possibilities for protective orders); 
infra Part III.B (addressing the inconsistent application of redaction and protective orders 
between the HIV record cases and two of the partial-birth abortion record disputes). 
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B. Analyzing Privacy:  Differing Applications of Redaction and Protective 
Orders 
Although the Rules permit courts to deny discovery, the Rules also 
permit and encourage modification of discovery requests through 
redaction and protective orders.230  Unfortunately, inconsistency arises in 
comparing how the two categories of cases approach these privacy-
shielding options.231  While the HIV-patient cases again followed the 
intent of the Rules, the analyses applied in the PBAB challenges 
regarding privacy did not adhere to the discovery Rules’ intent.232   
Although the HIV-patient cases have applied redaction and 
protective orders differently, each decision provided an appropriate 
balance between promoting discovery and protecting privacy.233  First, in 
Puget Sound, the Supreme Court of Washington refused to prohibit 
discovery without tangible evidence that disclosing medical records 
would adversely affect blood donation, which is consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Whalen.234 
Furthermore, in deciding Meachum, the District Court of Connecticut 
allocated appropriate concern to the privacy rights of the inmates.235  
This ruling exemplified the Rules’ intent for courts to practice modifying 
over quashing subpoenas because modification simultaneously reduces 
the undue burden and permits discovery.236   
                                                 
230 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). 
231 Compare infra text accompanying notes 234–41 (addressing the sound reasoning within 
Puget Sound, Meachum, Cuomo, and Rasmussen), with infra text accompanying notes 242–63 
(describing the flawed reasoning regarding redaction and protective orders in Northwestern 
Memorial and California’s Planned Parenthood). 
232 See infra text accompanying notes 242–73; see also Nw. Mem’l, 362 F.3d at 933–40 
(Manion, J., dissenting) (discussing the inappropriate deference that the Seventh Circuit 
granted the privacy claims). 
233 See infra text accompanying notes 235–41. 
234 See Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Ctr., 819 P.2d 370, 377–78 (Wash. 1991); see also Whalen 
v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 601–04 (1977) (holding that the possibility of public disclosure alone is 
not an impermissible invasion of privacy). 
235 See Doe v. Meachum, 126 F.R.D. 444, 449–50 (D. Conn. 1989).  It is unlikely that the 
privacy concern for inmates was granted less deference due to their incarceration because 
the court did not discuss the inmates’ privacy right as less important than other citizens’ 
right to privacy.  Id. 
236 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c); see also Nw. Mem’l v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 936 (7th Cir. 
2004) (Manion, J., dissenting) (referencing Reprod. Servs., Inc. v. Walker, 439 U.S. 1307, 
1308 (1978) (enforcing a subpoena for abortion records that were redacted)). 
Schumaker: Rules Were Not Meant to be Broken:  Alleviating the Tension Betwe
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2006
884 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40 
Finally, the court’s holding in Cuomo extends the preference for 
modification.237  Requiring a protective order in addition to redaction 
deferred to the inmates’ privacy interests.238  In these cases, redaction 
and a protective order were sufficient means of lessening or eliminating 
the undue burden on the disclosing party.239  Additionally, in Rasmussen, 
the Florida appellate court’s discovery denial on the basis of privacy 
suitably applied discovery as a neutral procedural device.240   
Disappointingly, the courts’ holdings in the PBAB challenges 
contradict the holdings in the HIV-patient cases regarding privacy, 
redaction, and protective orders.  As a result, these cases contradict the 
intent driving the discovery Rules.241  The Seventh Circuit’s response to 
the loss of privacy as an undue burden upon the partial-birth abortion 
patients in Northwestern Memorial illustrates a flawed application of the 
discovery Rules because it lacks neutrality.242  Rather than attempting to 
modify the subpoena through a protective order, as required by the 
courts in Meachum and Cuomo, the Seventh Circuit chose to quash the 
subpoena, expressing concern that redaction would not protect the 
patients’ privacy interest.243  Thus, it flatly denied modification through a 
protective order and redaction, ignoring Rule 26’s available 
protections.244 
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit’s assertion that the patients’ 
identities would be disclosed despite redaction amounted to mere 
speculation that will cause confusion in the application of the discovery 
Rules.245  Any objection to discovery on the basis of privacy may present 
                                                 
237 See Inmates of N.Y. with HIV v. Cuomo, No. 90-CV-252, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1488, at 
*7, *10–11 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 1991) (permitting discovery of the medical records for 
evaluation in the civil rights claim due to the protective order and redaction of individual 
patient information). 
238 See id. 
239 See S. Fla. Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 801–04 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1985) (explaining that identifying the blood donors in addition to producing medical 
records would cause an undue burden because identification had little probative value). 
240 See id. 
241 See infra text accompanying notes 243–63 (describing the courts’ reluctance to utilize 
the options of redaction and protective orders in Northwestern Memorial and California’s 
Planned Parenthood). 
242 See Nw. Mem’l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 929, 931–32 (7th Cir. 2004) (describing 
the court’s reasoning that the invasion of privacy outweighed the probative value of the 
medical records). 
243 See id. 
244 See id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1281 (7th ed. 1999). 
245 Compare supra text accompanying note 157 (explaining the Seventh Circuit’s argument 
that partial-birth abortion patients’ identities may still be revealed despite redaction), with 
notes 76–82 and accompanying text (setting forth the background of HIPAA and the 
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an argument that identification may occur, but without a tangible danger 
that public disclosure will occur, courts should not grant deference to 
this argument because Rule 45(c) requires that parties claiming an undue 
burden must provide tangible reasons explaining why the court should 
limit discovery.246  Essentially, this reasoning produced an implicit 
exception for abortion records due to the Seventh Circuit’s heightened 
criticism of the ability of protective orders and redaction to maintain 
privacy for these particular patients.247  This exception has the same 
effect as a privilege for abortion records, which the Seventh Circuit 
deemed inappropriate in the same opinion.248   
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit’s approach in Northwestern Memorial 
ignored HIPAA’s privacy protection of only individually identifiable 
information from disclosure without consent.249  As the dissenting 
opinion pointed out, the Seventh Circuit ignored the extensive 
requirements that HIPAA’s regulation would place on the disclosure of 
medical records as well as HIPAA’s encouragement of protective 
orders.250  These deletions, which would include names, small 
geographic areas, the initial three digits of zip codes for areas with less 
than 20,000 people, and any dates that could indicate the age of the 
patient, would make identification nearly impossible.251  To further 
insulate against disclosure, the Seventh Circuit could have implemented 
a protective order similar to those in Cuomo and Meachum that would 
require complete confidentiality during litigation.252  However, the 
                                                                                                             
extensive regulation defining how records may be modified so they are not individually 
identifiable).  But see Coffin, supra note 87 (“[A]lthough numerous other courts had 
previously concluded that privacy rights were not affected when patients’ names and other 
identifying information were removed . . . this court reasoned that no amount of ID-
scrubbing could stop this alleged invasion of privacy.”). 
246 See FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3)(A)(iv). 
247 See Nw. Mem’l, 362 F.3d at 923; see also Coffin, supra note 87 (discussing the court’s odd 
protection of abortion records but not other medical records). 
248 See id. at 926 (describing the Seventh Circuit’s reluctance to create a privilege for 
abortion records because there are many types of records, such as HIV-patient records, that 
are equally as sensitive as partial-birth abortion records).  
249 See id. at 933–34 (Manion, J., dissenting) (describing that the government sought only 
redacted materials and that redactions would protect the patients’ privacy); see also 45 
C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i). 
250 See id. 
251 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b)(2)(i). 
252 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (describing the available protective orders that courts may 
implement); 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b)(2)(i). 
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Seventh Circuit, without addressing such possibilities, chose simply to 
quash the subpoena.253  
Finally, the Seventh Circuit’s refusal to utilize HIPAA’s regulations 
or Rule 26’s protective orders demonstrates the court’s complete 
deference to speculative privacy concerns.254  In implementing HIPAA, 
Congress intended to protect individually identifiable material from 
disclosure, and the extensive regulations reflect this concern.255  As the 
dissent asserts, in refusing to follow the regulation addressing redaction, 
the Seventh Circuit’s decision indirectly undermines HIPAA.256  
Additionally, the court’s refusal to consider a protective order ignores 
Rule 26’s intent to include as much information as possible in 
discovery.257  It is suspect that the Seventh Circuit, considering the 
politically significant Partial-Birth Abortion Ban, did not consider 
redaction or protective orders, while the courts deciding the HIV-patient 
cases accepted these methods of protection.258  
The California district court decision in Planned Parenthood followed 
the Seventh Circuit’s approach, but this decision lacked justification for 
the claim that redaction would result in identification.259  This line of 
reasoning, which questions the effectiveness of redaction, is 
unconvincing because there was no evidence in this case to show that 
following the guidelines set forth in HIPAA’s regulation would fail to 
protect the patients’ identities.260  Moreover, the cases addressing the 
                                                 
253 See Nw. Mem’l, 362 F.3d at 933–40 (Manion, J., dissenting) (reasoning that redaction 
would be an appropriate means to protect the patient’s identities). 
254 See supra notes 78–82 and accompanying text (describing that HIPAA protects only 
individually identifiable medical records). 
255 See supra notes 76–82 and accompanying text. 
256 See Nw. Mem’l, 362 F.3d at 939 (stating that the majority’s decision ultimately damages 
Congress’ finding that a partial-birth abortion is never necessary to protect a woman’s 
health). 
257 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (permitting several types of protective orders for courts to 
preclude public disclosure of discovery material); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 
(1979); ACF Indus. v. EEOC, 439 U.S. 1081, 1087–88 (1979); supra notes 27, 31 and 
accompanying text (describing the intent of the discovery Rules to allow broad 
examination of information relevant to the claims, defenses, and subject matter of the 
litigation). 
258 See Nw. Mem’l, 362 F.3d at 933–35 (Manion, J., dissenting) (criticizing the court’s 
approach to redaction); supra note 48 and accompanying text (laying out the 
encouragement of modification and the possible protective orders available). 
259 See Planned Parenthood of Am., Inc. v. Ashcroft, No. C 03-4872 PJH, 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 3383, at *6–7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2004). 
260 See id. (setting forth the court’s reasoning that information, such as “types of 
contraception, sexual abuse or rape, marital status, and the presence or absence of sexually 
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admissibility of HIV-patients’ records did not question whether 
redaction would suffice.261  It is peculiar that the argument that redaction 
is ineffective arises only in cases addressing the constitutionality of the 
PBAB.262    
Increasing the confusion that the decisions in Northwestern Memorial 
and Planned Parenthood caused are two additional challenges to the PBAB 
that did not adopt a highly stringent approach to discovery disputes.263  
These decisions provide an appropriate manner of discerning whether 
the Government may discover partial-birth abortion patients’ medical 
records because the decisions reflect the flexible intent of the Rules and 
apply redaction and protective orders to protect patients’ privacy 
concerns.264  As such, it is unclear how the federal courts should analyze 
the admittance of partial-birth abortion patients’ records in the 
challenges to the PBAB.265  The potential danger lies in the fact that the 
Seventh Circuit is currently the only circuit court to rule on this issue, 
and it has applied flawed reasoning.266 
The Seventh Circuit’s reasoning, allowing deference to outside 
concerns within a procedural phase of litigation, demonstrates 
inappropriate Rule application.267  As the cases addressing the PBAB are 
more recent than the HIV-patient cases, the PBAB challenges may set a 
trend in the manner in which courts address the admissibility of medical 
records.268  This is an undesired trend for two reasons.  First, the 
                                                                                                             
transmitted diseases,” would result in identification, without providing how identification 
might occur). 
261 See supra Part II.C.1. 
262 See Nw. Mem’l, 362 F.3d at 933–35 (Manion, J., dissenting) (arguing that HIPAA’s 
regulation would effectively protect the patients’ privacy). 
263 See Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Ashcroft, No. 03 Civ. 8695 (RCC), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
4530, at *2–8, *17, *21–23 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2004); Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Ashcroft, No. 04-
70658, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4491, at *1–3 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 12, 2004). 
264 See Nat’l Abortion Fed’n (N.Y.), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4530, at *2–8, *17, *21–23; Nat’l 
Abortion Fed’n (Mich.), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4491, at *1–3. 
265 Compare Nw. Mem’l 362 F.3d 923 (7th Cir. 2004) (quashing a subpoena for medical 
records of a doctor who performed partial-birth abortions), and Planned Parenthood, 2004 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3383 (denying discovery of medical records in light of patients’ privacy 
interests), with Nat’l Abortion Fed’n (N.Y.), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4530 (granting the 
enforcement of a subpoena against a New York Hospital for medical records), and Nat’l 
Abortion Fed’n (Mich.), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 449 (ordering the University of Michigan to 
comply with subpoena for medical records). 
266 See supra text accompanying notes 243–59. 
267 See supra note 30 and accompanying text (citing an Advisory Committee’s note that 
emphasizes the need to apply the Rules even-handedly). 
268 See supra text accompanying notes 242–59 (describing the problems with the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision regarding the protection of privacy). 
Schumaker: Rules Were Not Meant to be Broken:  Alleviating the Tension Betwe
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2006
888 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40 
provisions within HIPAA were designed to protect patients from 
unconsented disclosure of private information.269  However, two of the 
PBAB challenges ignore the ability of HIPAA to protect patients’ privacy 
through redaction.270  Thus, the reasoning that questions the validity of 
redaction undermines legislation intended to protect patients’ medical 
records in light of current technology and the free flow of information.271  
Questioning whether HIPAA’s regulations effectively protect patient 
privacy was inappropriate in Northwestern Memorial because the criticism 
was based on conjecture, not concrete instances of the regulation’s 
ineffectiveness.272   
The second problem of these inconsistent decisions lies in the judicial 
system.273  As recently as 2000, the Advisory Committee has revised the 
federal Rules to encourage rather than limit discovery.274  If the trend 
that scrutinizes relevance, redaction, and protective orders continues, 
federal courts will apply precedent that is disjointed from the Rules’ 
intent.275  Also, in light of privacy concerns, it is inappropriate to 
scrutinize the loss of privacy differently for partial-birth abortion and 
HIV medical records.276  The willingness of two district courts to utilize 
the same analysis for the loss of privacy in discovery of partial-birth 
abortion patients’ medical records as the analysis used in the HIV-
                                                 
269 See supra notes 78–82 and accompanying text. 
270 See generally Nw. Mem’l, 362 F.3d at 923; Planned Parenthood, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
3383. 
271 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320d-6(b); supra notes 78–82 and accompanying text (providing a 
summary of the HIPAA privacy rule). 
272 See supra text accompanying notes 246–49 (describing that the Seventh Circuit’s 
criticism of redaction was unfounded). 
273 See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979); ACF Indus. v. EEOC, 439 U.S. 1081, 
1087–88 (1979) (describing that the lower courts have the responsibility to make correct 
discovery decisions because these decisions are difficult to reverse, as they are based on 
discretion). 
274 See supra notes 33–36 (setting forth the intent of the 2000 Advisory Committee to apply 
a flexible good cause standard, implying a broad scope of discovery). 
275 Compare Nw. Mem’l, 362 F.3d 923 (quashing a subpoena for medical records of a doctor 
who performed partial-birth abortions), and Planned Parenthood, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3383 
(denying discovery of medical records in light of patients’ privacy interests), with Nat’l 
Abortion Fed’n v. Ashcroft, No. 03 Civ. 8695 (RCC), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4530 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 18, 2004) (granting the enforcement of a subpoena against a New York Hospital for 
medical records), and Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Ashcroft, No. 04-70658, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
4491 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 12, 2004) (ordering the University of Michigan to comply with a 
subpoena for medical records). 
276 See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text (describing the similar social stigmas 
attached to HIV records and partial-birth abortion records); supra note 152 and 
accompanying text (describing the Seventh Circuit’s hesitation to treat abortion records 
differently from other medical records). 
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patient cases indicates that the two types of medical records deserve 
similar discussion.277  Additionally, the Seventh Circuit’s rejection of an 
exception for partial-birth abortion records reinforces that the Rules 
should apply to each type of medical record similarly.278  Therefore, 
granting more deference to the privacy interests of partial-birth abortion 
patients than to HIV-patients is inappropriate.279   
In light of the confusion these cases present and the attention the 
PBAB challenges will receive due to the political ramifications of the 
decision, the federal courts face the demanding task of striking the 
appropriate balance between patients’ privacy and the probative interest 
of medical records.280  Accordingly, these courts must make these 
decisions without considering the merits driving these challenges to the 
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban.281  
IV.  MODEL APPROACH TO CURB THE ABUSE OF DISCOVERY RULES 
[S]o our decrees, 
Dead to infliction, to themselves are dead, 
And liberty plucks injustice by the nose;. . .  
[A]nd quite athwart [g]oes all decorum.282 
Potential ambiguity in decisions regarding the admission of medical 
records lies in the courts’ application of clearly established rules.  
Therefore, just as Vincentio substituted his judgment for Angelo’s by 
                                                 
277 Compare Nat’l Abortion Fed’n (N.Y.), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4530 (granting the 
enforcement of a subpoena against a New York Hospital for medical records), and Nat’l 
Abortion Fed’n (Mich.), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4491 (ordering the University of Michigan to 
comply with a subpoena for medical records), with Inmates of N.Y. with HIV v. Cuomo, 
No. 90-CV-252, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1488 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 1991) (ordering discovery of 
HIV-infected inmates’ medical records), and Doe v. Meachum, 126 F.R.D. 444 (D. Conn. 
1989) (permitting discovery of HIV patient records to evaluate the correctional facilities 
treatment of HIV-infected inmates), and Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Center, 819 P.2d 370 
(Wash. 1991) (permitting discovery of blood donor’s medical records). 
278 See Nw. Mem’l, 362 F.3d at 926 (reasoning that because HIV-patient medical records 
had similar sensitivity to partial-birth abortion records, different treatment for the two 
types of records would be inappropriate). 
279 Id. 
280 See supra text accompanying notes 46–47 (describing that courts must balance between 
the competing factors when the party opposing discovery claims an undue burden); see also 
Manson, supra note 159 (describing the Seventh Circuit’s decision, commenting that these 
decisions are part of a “fight being fought on several battlefields across the country”). 
281 See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
282 SHAKESPEARE, supra note 1, at act 1, sc. 3, ll.27–31.  Vincentio concludes his lament 
about the state of affairs in Vienna by saying that because the laws have not been inflicted 
on the people, they are, in essence, dead.  Id.  Hence, all order within the city has been lost.  
Id. 
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applying flexibility to the law at the conclusion of Measure for Measure, 
the federal courts’ application of the Rules of discovery should reflect the 
intent to foster the just adjudication of every claim.283  A model 
approach, synthesized from the decisions described herein, would set 
the appropriate balance between the competing interests of patient 
privacy and the probative value of medical records.  Hence, these 
general guidelines will remind federal courts to maintain the Rules’ 
intent.284   
Revision of the Rules themselves would be inappropriate because 
the problem lies in recent rule application that may set a trend divergent 
to the Rules’ purpose.285  Thus, a general two-step approach that 
encompasses the discovery Rules’ intent curtails the problems with 
relevance and the implementation of redaction and protective orders.286  
The ultimate impact of this approach favors discovery of medical 
records, emphasizing the application of redaction and protective 
orders.287  This is a model approach, not a model decision, so this 
Contribution recognizes that permitting discovery may not be 
appropriate in every situation.288   
A. Medical Records Are Generally Relevant  
The first step in the model judicial reasoning is to address relevance 
with flexibility, favoring discovery.  In finding that the medical records 
are relevant, courts should begin with the baseline justification that the 
medical records need not be admissible in trial for examination during 
the discovery process.289  Thus, if the proponent of the records can show 
that information in the records offers potentially admissible evidence, 
then the relevance requirement has been fulfilled.290  Therefore, it should 
                                                 
283 Id.  Vincentio, realizing that Angelo was guilty of the same actions as Claudio, 
delegated punishments at the conclusion of the play.  Id. at act 5, sc. 1.  However, none of 
these punishments included the death sentence.  Id. 
284 See supra Part II.A (setting forth the purpose of the Rules). 
285 See generally supra Part III (analyzing the inconsistent Rule application in two recent 
federal court decisions). 
286 See infra Parts IV.A–B. 
287 See supra Part III.B (describing the value of utilizing redaction and protective orders in 
discovery disputes); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). 
288 For instance, there may exist situations where the use of medical records may be 
completely inappropriate and simply a means to harass the opposing party.  In that 
instance, this approach would not need to apply and the court would simply deny 
discovery in order to “protect [the] party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, 
oppression, or undue burden or expense.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). 
289 See id. at 26(b). 
290 See id. 
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be quite clear when a party is making a completely irrelevant request, 
and in that case courts should quash the subpoena or refuse the 
discovery request.   
Problems in analyzing relevance may arise when there is a tangential 
relationship between the medical records and a legal argument.291  The 
opposing party may claim that it is irrelevant to a “claim or defense of 
any party.”292  However, because Rule 26 provides that “good cause” 
may allow discovery of information within the subject matter of the 
claim and good cause is a flexible standard, a legal argument should 
suffice.293  Thus, even with a tangential relationship, as long as the 
proponent makes a feasible legal argument that the information sought 
may lead to admissible evidence, the relevance analysis is complete.294 
Additionally, if the courts adhere to the intended flexible standard 
for relevance, they should not accept arguments claiming that the 
information is only marginally relevant.  When the opposing party only 
claims lack of relevance, not that admission results in an undue burden, 
courts must not measure the level of relevance.295  If the sole argument is 
relevance, the only test that Rule 26(b) sets forth is whether the 
information is “reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence.”  
Thus, if the proponent of the medical records fulfills this goal, the court’s 
analysis of relevance should be satisfied.   
However, if the opposing party complains that admitting the 
medical records would create an undue burden, the analysis of relevance 
must change.  The courts must examine the level of relevance, the 
burden upon the parties involved, the issues of the litigation, and the 
importance of discovery to the dispute.296  The courts must consider the 
value of redaction and protective orders because a large aspect of this 
balancing test measures the burden of discovery and the issues involved.  
Thus, in addressing these two options, courts may solve the problem of 
loss of privacy, which is often a significant issue at stake in the discovery 
                                                 
291 See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text (describing that not all discoverable 
information is clearly relevant to the claim, allowing the use of the good cause standard to 
permit discovery of material relevant to the subject matter of the dispute). 
292 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b). 
293 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 213 (7th ed. 1999). 
294 See Doe v. Meachum, 126 F.R.D. 444, 449 (Wash. 1991) (describing that the medical 
records would later become relevant after expert analysis, thus fulfilling the relevance 
requirement). 
295 See supra notes 208–20 and accompanying text (describing that it is inappropriate to 
quantify relevance without an undue burden claim). 
296 See supra text accompanying note 47. 
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of medical records.297  An imperative point that the courts must not 
ignore is that consideration of the issues at stake must be evenly applied, 
and the courts cannot allow the inclusion of public policy considerations 
within discovery to make these procedural rules a means of destroying 
legal arguments.298 
B. Admit the Redacted Records and Issue a Protective Order 
The second part of the model judicial reasoning supports imposing 
redaction and protective orders.  Courts should accept that redaction and 
protective orders are suitable means of maintaining patient privacy.299  
The model approach asserts that the parties must have access to all 
possible information to develop all necessary legal arguments.300  Thus, 
parties wishing to examine medical records for possible arguments must, 
at the very least, examine them.  If disclosure of the information within 
the records would breach the patients’ privacy, then the information 
must be redacted.301  Because the patient is no longer identifiable once 
redaction occurs, there is no reason to address privacy further.302   
Despite redaction, opposing parties may claim that redaction may 
still result in identification due to the nature of the medical records 
sought.303  At this point, courts must impose a protective order, barring 
parties from disclosing the information in the medical records beyond 
litigation.  This option should satisfy both parties, as it allows discovery 
of the medical information while protecting the patients from public 
disclosure of personal information.304  Also, as Rule 26(c) indicates, there 
are various means by which the courts can implement a protective 
                                                 
297 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). 
298 See supra note 30. 
299 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c); supra notes 78–82 and accompanying text (describing the 
requirements of HIPAA, which protects only individually identifiable information and 
therefore deems that no privacy rights exist for information that has been redacted). 
300 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b). 
301 See generally 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i) for a description of the various items that 
must be deleted to ensure full redaction and negate any privacy interest. 
302 See id. 
303 For instance, the opposition may claim that in a small community, minimal 
information within abortion records may still result in identification because of public 
familiarity with reputations of the women in the community. 
304 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)–(8) for a listing of the different approaches that courts may 
use for protective orders. 
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order.305  Therefore, the courts may accommodate different situations 
that may arise.306 
C. The Model Approach 
A sample methodology for the admission of medical records follows 
the structure of Rule 26 and implements the Rule’s tendency favoring 
disclosure.307  This sample lies in favor of the discovery of the medical 
records despite arguments opposing the relevance of the medical records 
and claiming that the admission presents an undue burden.  In order to 
clearly exemplify the Rules’ language and intent, federal courts may find 
the following sequence beneficial: 
 The threshold question the court must ask is 
whether the information contained in the medical 
records is relevant.  If the records are not relevant, then 
this Court must quash the discovery order.  However, as 
long as the proponent shows that a reasonable person 
could conclude that the medical records may result in 
admissible evidence, then this Court will deem the 
medical records relevant.  The proponent does not need 
to assert a legal argument at this time, only a logical 
relationship between the medical records and a claim or 
defense of this matter.   
 The party opposing admission argues that the 
information is not relevant for two reasons.  First, it 
argues that the information in the medical records is not 
directly related to a claim or defense.  This argument 
fails because the proponent of the discovery of this 
information has fulfilled the flexible good cause 
requirement by showing that the information is relevant 
to the subject matter of the dispute.  Specifically, the 
proponent asserted that the medical records likely 
contain information related to a defense that may be 
admissible at trial.  Therefore, the opponent’s argument 
is insufficient. 
                                                 
305 See id. 
306 See id.  For instance, rather than producing medical records, it may be possible to take 
the deposition of a doctor that performed the medical procedure.  See id.  Additionally, the 
court may require that the deposition cover only certain topics.  See id.  Thus, the court may 
preclude discovery of personal information about the patients, protecting their privacy. 
307 See generally id. at 26(b),(c). 
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 Second, the opposition claims that the information is 
only marginally relevant.  Again, this argument fails.  
The party opposing this disclosure claims that admission 
of the medical records imposes an undue burden.  
Under this claim, this Court must balance the burden of 
admission against the benefit of disclosure, taking into 
account the needs of the case, the amount in 
controversy, the resources of the parties, the importance 
of the issues at stake, and the importance of the medical 
records in resolving this dispute.308  Therefore, this 
Court must quantify the relevance of the medical 
records to the present litigation.  The proponent of this 
discovery request has asserted that the medical records 
may contain information that may provide additional 
evidence regarding damages.  This information is not 
highly relevant because the proponent cannot specify 
what is sought.  This Court must balance the benefit of 
this information against the burden it presents, 
examining other issues involved.  This Court may 
therefore examine the potential loss of patient privacy 
that may occur in disclosing the medical records.   
 Without modification, admitting the medical records 
will result in a public disclosure of the records.  
Therefore, potentially embarrassing and personally 
damaging information will become accessible to the 
public.  Recognizing that privacy is a fundamental, 
albeit conditionally fundamental right, this Court orders 
modification of this discovery request.  In order to 
protect the individuals within the medical records, this 
Court orders redaction of the records, where all 
information that may be individually identifiable will be 
deleted.  The records shall be modified according to the 
requirements of HIPAA.309   
 Additionally, this court orders a protective order 
according to Rule 26(c) to protect the identities of the 
patients and alleviate the asserted undue burden.310  
Thus, the records will be filed in a sealed envelope to be 
                                                 
308 Id. at 26(b)(2). 
309 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i). 
310 FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c). 
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opened only for the use of litigation, and the information 
within the documents will not be revealed beyond the 
scope of the litigation.311  At no time may either party 
identify the patients within the medical records.  Thus, 
after balancing the various factors in play and protecting 
the objecting party’s privacy interest, the motion to 
quash the subpoena for production of documents is 
denied, and the discovery subpoena stands subject to the 
protective order and redaction requirement above. 
 In the alternative, if the opposing party did not 
claim that the admission was an undue burden, the 
argument would still fail.  Rule 26(b)(1) allows discovery 
of relevant material.312  It does not state that only highly 
relevant information may be discovered or that 
marginally relevant information is not discoverable.  
Therefore, this Court will not examine the level of 
relevance as the opposition requests.   
As this is a sample approach, the federal courts must modify the 
reasoning according to the facts and arguments each party presents.  
However, this general approach will aid the courts in addressing the 
Rules correctly and according to the liberal intent of the rules.  The 
courts must grant credence to redaction and protective orders, as Rule 26 
provides for various ways in which the court may modify discovery 
orders.313  This approach recognizes that parties wishing to develop 
strong legal arguments must examine various avenues, and that it is 
often impossible to create an in-depth legal argument to support a 
discovery request.  If the federal courts adopt this general approach to all 
discovery disputes pertaining to medical records, decisions will be more 
consistent. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Rules of discovery intend to open the door to a wide array of 
investigation, allowing each party to examine every possible legal 
argument.  Some topics of inquiry, namely medical records, offer 
information of a nature that the patient may not wish to become public.  
Thus, a tension exists between the encouragement of aggressive 
litigation tactics and the hesitancy to invade privacy rights. 
                                                 
311 See id. at 26(c). 
312 See id. at 26(b). 
313 See id. at 26(c). 
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Recent decisions reflecting this tension assert reasoning that diverges 
from both past decisions as well as the purpose of Rule 26.  In comparing 
discovery decisions regarding HIV-patients’ medical records with 
decisions regarding partial-birth abortion patients’ medical records, the 
more recent PBAB challenges present flawed decisions that deny 
discovery.  As the Seventh Circuit presented a line of reasoning that may 
serve as a reference for future PBAB challenges, the federal courts must 
avoid eroding procedural rules because of the policy interests at play.  
Despite the social and political ramifications of the PBAB, procedural 
matters must remain such, and a preliminary decision must not 
determine this statute’s constitutionality. 
The federal courts may maintain the Rules of discovery by 
implementing reasoning consistent with the language of Rule 26.  
Additionally, the courts must recognize the value of the numerous 
protective orders that Rule 26 offers.  Without this recognition, parties 
will lose legal arguments before they form, granting substantive value to 
a procedural step in litigation.  Thus, just as Measure for Measure’s 
Vincentio approached the application of law with flexibility in order to 
provide proportionate and just punishment, the federal courts must 
utilize the flexible nature of the Rules by promoting extensive discovery 
through redaction and protective orders. 
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